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REASON AND REASONABLENESS: THE
NECESSARY DIVERSITY OF THE COMMON LAW
Frédéric G. Sourgens*
ABSTRACT
This Article addresses the central concept of “reasonableness” in the common
law and constitutional jurisprudence. On the basis of three examples, the common
law of torts, the common law of contracts, and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
the Article notes that different areas of the law follow fundamentally inconsistent
utilitarian, pragmatic, and formalist reasonableness paradigms. The significance of
this diversity of reasonableness paradigms remains largely under-theorized. This
Article submits that the diversity of reasonableness paradigms is a necessary
feature of the common law. It theorizes that the utilitarian, pragmatic and formalist
paradigms are structural elements driving the common law norm-generation
process. This theory permits a new, more precise definition of hard cases as cases
in which these paradigms lead to different results in a specific legal dispute. It
further provides a legal criterion to determine whether hard cases have been
correctly resolved as a legal matter rather than as a matter of policy. On the basis
of this new understanding of hard cases, it is possible to explain a question left
unresolved by Frederick Schauer’s article The Limited Domain of the Law namely
how the common law develops as a limited domain while remaining responsive to
changes in community standards and policy preferences. By means of this theory,
this article analyzes an important, and potentially dispositive, conceptual confusion
underlying the recent Supreme Court affirmative action decision Fisher v.
University of Texas and its treatment of good faith, and explains how that confusion
can be overcome by future courts applying the decision.
[U]nd die findigenTieremerkenesschon,
dasswirnichtsehrverlässlichzuHaussind
in der gedeuteten Welt.
Rainer Maria Rilke1
I. INTRODUCTION
Reasonableness is the keystone of the common law. The edifice of the
common law would collapse but for the balance struck between diverse and
competing ends and interests by “reasonableness.” For instance, reasonableness
governs liability in negligence cases,2 determines what performance a contract

* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn Law School.
1. Rainer Maria Rilke, Die Erste Elegie, in DUINESER ELEGIEN 7 (InselVerlag, 1923) (translated:
“and the animals shrewdly noticed already, [¶] that we fail to be safely at home, [¶] in the interpreted
world.”).
2. See, e.g., Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323
(2012).
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requires,3 sets the scope of permissible police intrusion in people’s private affairs,4
defines the limit of criminal liability,5 and administers the diversity of the student
body at state universities.6 It informs corporate law,7 banking law,8 commercial
law,9 bankruptcy law,10 and civil procedure.11
In all of these settings, “reasonableness” recognizes that there is not one
absolute rule of conduct premised upon moral or religious command. Instead, law
depends upon the reciprocal regard for the interests of others—even and
particularly those others holding different moral, religious, and political points of
view.12 What this reciprocal regard legally requires of us is determined by a
balancing test governed by the reasonableness standard.
This “reasonableness” standard is deceptively intuitive: every person believes
to know what is or is not “reasonable.”13 On its face, when people disagree with
3. See, e.g., Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, Good Faith Performance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 689 passim
(2013) (discussing reasonableness standards as part of good faith in contract law); Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith Purchase, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1359-1363
(2011) (contrasting fault in contracts to fault in negligence by reference to reasonableness standards).
4. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO.
L.J. 1077, 1093 (2011).
5. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611 passim
(2011).
6. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Fisher, Academic Freedom, and Distrust, 59 LOY. L. REV. 489, 505
(2013) (noting the role of reasonableness in university decisions to choose allocation of resources).
7. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1171 (2013) (“The inquiry in corporation law focuses on the demonstrable
effort and the quality of decisionmaking as the measure of reasonableness, and thus an error in judgment
is not a wrong. The answer to the question—what would a reasonable director do?—does not lie in a
review of the substance of the business decisions, but instead on the substance of good faith and effort
made by the custodians toward the care of the corporation.”); Leo Strine, Jr. et al, Loyalty’s Core
Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 671 (2010) (“The
Delaware Supreme Court then made plain that the enhanced burden it was imposing on directors to
show that they had a good faith, reasonable basis to believe that the corporation faced a threat was
designed ‘to ensure that a defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover is indeed motivated by a
good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its stockholders.’”) (citations omitted).
8. See, e.g., Diane Lourdes Dick, Confronting the Certainty Imperative in Corporate Finance
Jurisprudence, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1461, 1524 (2011) (“As a final step, the court might test the
reasonableness of any outcome by comparing the end result to what would occur in the absence of
judicial intervention. Essentially, this final step assures that the court's intervention does not
substantially deviate from the course that is most likely to be taken in the absence of judicial
involvement. It merely removes the rent-seeking, contractual arbitrage and other inefficiencies that
derive from the disparity between present-day economic realities and strict contractual rights.”).
9. See, e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Unfortunate Life and Merciful Death
of the Avoidance Powers Under Section 103 of the Durbin-Delahunt Bill: What Were They Thinking?,
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1829, 1841 (2004).
10. See, e.g., Jessica D. Gabel, Midnight in the Garden of Good Faith: Using Clawback Actions to
Harvest the Equitable Roots of Bankrupt Ponzi Schemes, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19 passim (2012).
11. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial Rule Making, 107
NW. L. REV. 447, 467 n.135 (2013) (discussing the role of good faith in discovery).
12. Cf. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 79-84 (2d ed. 2001) (making a similar point about Greek political theory in
the context of a discussion of Sophocles’ Antigone).
13. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (2003) (“The reasonable person test converts the esoteric and intractable
distinction between reasonable and unreasonable risks into a comprehensible, intuitive inquiry.”).
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one another whether specific conduct was reasonable, as they may do in jury
deliberations, they discuss specific facts of a case and not their abstract moral
commitments. This impression is deceptive because reasonableness continues to
draw on the very moral and political commitments, which it would seek to
circumvent. In difficult cases, these commitments can in fact be outcome
determinative.14
What then, is the content of the reasonableness standard upon which the
common law relies? Doctrine exhaustively discusses this question within each area
of the common law.15 What so far has escaped scholarly attention is that different
areas of law rely upon inconsistent utilitarian, pragmatic, and formalist paradigms
of reasonableness.16 Thus, as discussed in part I.A, the law of negligence relies
upon a utilitarian reasonableness paradigm, the so-called “Hand formula.”17
According to the “Hand formula,” a person is liable for negligence if the cost of
adequate precautions is smaller than the multiple of the probability of injury times
its gravity.18 As discussed in part I.B, this conception of reasonableness classically
has been rejected by the law of contracts.19 The law of contracts instead relies
upon a pragmatic reasonableness paradigm.20 According to this paradigm,
reasonableness depends upon whether other like-situated people would deem that
there is a rational basis for the actions of the contracting parties, given their

14. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statemanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 976 (2008)
(“Of course, what qualifies as ‘reasonable’ disagreement, as opposed to ‘unreasonable’ or ‘the most
extreme,’ can be . . . based in contestable social values.”).
15. For recent contributions to this scholarship, see supra notes 2-11.
16. One might say that reasonableness in this sense is a “cryptotype” of American common law.
Rodolfo Sacco defines such as “cryptotypes” as follows:
Man continually follows rules of which he is not aware or which he would not be able to
formulate well. Few would be able to formulate the linguistic rule we follow when we
say "three dark suits" and not "three suits dark" whereas in special context we might
speak of "the meadows green." . . . Linguists are now defining this phenomenon. We are
subject to specific rules without perceiving them. Our visible, superficial language is the
result of identifiable transformations of latent linguistic patterns that are more permanent
than the visible ones.
Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law II, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343,
384-85 (1991).
17. See, e.g., Miller & Perry Torts, supra note 2, at 330-31 (“[T]he Restatement may be said to
adopt an almost unconstrained, reductionist, utilitarian-economic test for negligence”).
18. Id. at 328.
19. See, e.g., In re Gary Aircraft Corp., 681 F.2d 365, 375 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Texas courts have
repeatedly stated that the test of good faith is not negligence or diligence and that it is immaterial that
the buyer was aware of facts that would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry.”); R. Wilson
Freyermuth, Enforcement of Acceleration Provisions and the Rhetoric of Good Faith, 1998 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1035, 1056 (1998) (“As Professor Summers has noted in his work on good faith performance and
enforcement of sales contracts, the subjective standard should rule out claims that a party acted in bad
faith due to her negligence . . . .”). For further discussion of a recent rapprochement between negligence
and the law of contracts following the revisions to the U.C.C., see infra Part III.B.
20. On the influence of pragmatism on the development of U.S. common law, see Robert S.
Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought – A Synthesis and
Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861 (1981).
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contractual undertaking.21 As discussed in part I.C, reasonableness in the context
of the Fourth Amendment rejects this paradigm and instead applies a formalist
reasonableness paradigm.22 What is reasonable is determined by applying the
original constitutionally mandated equilibrium between the values of privacy and
security to current technological circumstances.23
The consequence of this clash of paradigms is significantly under-theorized.24
As discussed in Part III.A, the existence of competing utilitarian, pragmatic, or
formalist reasonableness paradigms is significant because it gives rise to hard cases
that arise whenever these paradigms require inconsistent results in a given dispute.
But as discussed in Part III.B, the existence of multiple reasonableness paradigms
also permits the law to develop by switching from one reasonableness paradigm to
another, and thus address a perceived normative failure in a specific area of law,
without losing the internal coherence of the law as whole.25 As discussed in Part
III.C, on the basis of the recent Supreme Court decision, Fisher v. University of
Texas on affirmative action, legal error can occur when courts fail to understand
that there are multiple conceptions of reasonableness within the common law.26 As
further discussed in Part III.C, this error can be avoided once the paradigm of
reasonableness adopted by the Court is appropriately understood.
Perhaps counterintuitively, this Article will conclude that the diversity of
reasonableness paradigms is a necessary, structural quality of the common law. As
discussed in Part IV.A, the presence of pragmatic, utilitarian, and formalist
reasonableness paradigms cannot be resolved by reference to some higher order
principle because each paradigm is axiomatic in its own right.27 Thus, the diversity
cannot be resolved through further doctrinal refinement because each paradigm
21. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW73-74 (1988)
(tracking the relationship between rule establishment and relevant community norms in the common law
in the context of the example of McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.).
22. See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476 (2011).
23. Id.
24. Some current scholarship discusses the limitations of any of the currently available theories to
understand the phenomenon of law. See Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of Law, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1909 (2004). It proposes that “[t]o understand what the members of this group hold in common
with each other but not with the members of most other social institutions is to try to understand not the
meaning of the word ‘law,’ and perhaps not even the concept of law, but the practice (in the
Wittgensteinian sense) of law as we know it and the institutions of the law as we know them.” See id at
1955-56. This article submits that the diversity of reasonableness paradigms within the common law
provides the grammar (in the Wittgensteinian sense) to understand the practice in question.
25. This phenomenon has frequently been noted but mischaracterized as principally rhetorical to
make palatable a policy shift. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 74; but see, e.g., Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Traditional Versus Economic Analysis: Evidence from Cardozo and Posner Torts
Opinions, 62 FLA. L. REV. 667, 669 (2010) (“Cardozo’s distinctiveness is a grand rhetorical style
exemplifying traditional method. During a twenty-four-year career, he displayed pragmatic sensibilities
blending intuitions of substantive justice with thick doctrine incorporating economic, moral, and social
factors. In Isaiah Berlin’s terms, Cardozo was a fox who knew many things. Cardozo frequently shifted
among doctrines, rendering complex opinions that demonstrate the capacity, power, and limits of
traditional legal analysis”). The rhetoric in question reflects a structural necessity rather than persuasive
flourish.
26. See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
27. See John Finnis, Response, 57 VILL. L. REV. 925, 930 (2012).
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represents a different legal first principle embedded within the common law.28 As
discussed in Part IV.B, this heterogeneity of first principles within the common law
confirms its structure as an inductive normative system rather than a deductive
one.29 Rules are generated from judicial problem solutions for specific cases;
general rules are not judicially applied to each specific problem.30
Although scholarship has long noticed the inductive structure of the common
law, it incorrectly assumed that the common law followed the inductive logic of
scientific inquiry, which typically uses a single paradigm at a time.31 As Part IV.B
explains, this assumption fails to account for two essential qualities of the inductive
process in the common law. First, unlike scientific inquiry, which theorizes from
the observation of an outside world through inductive reasoning, the common law
uses inductive reasoning to theorize about itself. Second, unlike scientific inquiry,
the common law uses inductive reasoning normatively, not descriptively. Inductive
reasoning explains why people ought to act in a certain way rather than why the
world already, of necessity, observes certain basic natural laws of its own accord.
The establishment of a “formal” paradigm of the law consequently must lag behind
the actual resolution of cases within the common law. The common law itself
cannot apply the paradigm as a matter of formal constraint without ceasing to be an
inductive system and becoming a deductive one instead. Consequently, if the
common law is an inductive system, it must at the same time rely upon multiple
paradigms to function. As an inductive system it would include formal paradigms
representing the currently theorized explanation of the law. And an inductive
system would also include pragmatic and utilitarian paradigms providing the basis
for further development of future formal paradigms.
Understanding that the common law at the same time relies upon inconsistent
pragmatic, formalist, and utilitarian reasonableness paradigms explains why the
common law appears at the same time to be both an independent “limited domain”
and an open system responding to social and political policy preferences. It thus
helps to resolve the ongoing debate among legal theorists whether law is a closed
domain by demonstrating that this debate focuses on an inapposite question. The
question is not whether the common law is an open or closed domain, but how it
can be both at the same time. This Article takes a first step towards providing that
answer.
II. DIVERGING THEORIES OF REASONABLENESS
Different areas of law apply markedly different reasonableness paradigms.
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, The Structural Constitutional Principle of Republican Legitimacy, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 425 (2012); Dennis J. Sweeney, The Common Law Process: A New Look at
an Ancient Value Delivery System, 79 WASH. L. REV. 251, 264-9 (2004). See also BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS22-23 (1921) (the common law’s “method is
inductive, and it draws its generalizations from particulars”); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW1 (1881) [hereinafter Holmes Common Law] (“[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it
has been experience”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-1
(1897) [hereinafter Holmes Path].
30. See, e.g., EISENBURG, supra note 21; Cunningham, supra note 25.
31. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS81, 96-105, 108 (2012).
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Depending upon the area of law, the common law relies upon utilitarian, pragmatic,
and formalist reasonableness paradigms. This Part provides an example for the use
of each of these reasonableness paradigms: negligence (applying utilitarianism),32
the common law of contracts (applying pragmatism),33 and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence (applying formalism).34
All three paradigms have in common that reasonableness takes account of the
diversity of ethical, moral, religious, and political commitments held by the
members of the society that it governs.35 Reasonableness is not a vehicle to
disguise the imposition of a comprehensive value system on society at large.36
Instead, each paradigm seeks to address this plurality of substantive moral
allegiances of the members of civic society by engaging in a balancing exercise
premised upon a different “basic unit” of judgment.
Importantly, as this Article will discuss, each of these attempts is ultimately
inconsistent with the others because it relies upon a different “basic unit” of
judgment. Utilitarianism looks to wealth maximization, pragmatism to community
standards, and formalism to values inherent in our constitutional tradition. This in
itself suggests that there is no universal common denominator of reasonableness,
no basic unit of judgment that could govern the entirety of human interaction.37
Reasonableness can only be understood across the law if one looks for something
other than a common substantive definition and looks for its structural significance,
instead.38
It is also not the case that an area of law is “naturally” linked to a certain kind
of reasonableness paradigm. In fact, areas of law themselves switch the
reasonableness paradigm upon which they rely: famously, the principle of “buyer
beware” dominated the law of contracts in the 19th century, premised upon a
formalist, laissez-faire reasonableness paradigm.39 Later, “[o]ver the course of the
twentieth century, the failure to disclose material facts during contract formation
increasingly placed parties at risk of violating the growing duty of good faith and
fair dealing in contracts” because of the adoption of a different, pragmatic
reasonableness paradigm.40 This Part’s analysis of reasonableness paradigms
within specific areas of law is not monolithic, but itself subject to change and
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. See infra Part II.B.
34. See infra Part II.C.
35. James Madison, The Federalist No. 10, DAILY ADVERTISER, Nov. 22, 1787 (explaining the
importance of maintaining these differences within a republican society); For a utilitarian take on this
diversity, see, for example, HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 296 (7th ed. 1907) [hereinafter
Sidgwick]; for a pragmatic one, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539, 1554 (1988); for a formalist one, see Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1055,
1063-4 (1975)
36. See Holmes, Common Law, supra note 30 at 1.
37. See infra Part IV.A.
38. See infra Part IV.B.
39. Florrie Young Roberts, Disclosure Duties in Real Estate Sales and Attempts to Reallocate Risk,
34 CONN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001). Compare Robert B. Reich, Toward a New Consumer Protection, 128 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979) (“The American economy has paid lip service for two hundred years to the twin
laissez-faire principles of vigorous competition and consumer self-reliance, the latter embodied in the
maxim caveat emptor.”).
40. Michelle Oberman, Sex, Lies, and the Duty to Disclose, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 880 (2005).
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challenge.41
Nevertheless, identifying the reasonableness paradigm at work in a particular
area of law is valuable. It lifts the common confusion that reasonableness is
amorphous or malleable and thus unpredictable.42 Reasonableness appears
amorphous or malleable because it is thought of incorrectly as a single principle
that is applied inconsistently,43 rather than as a multiplicity of concrete but
inconsistent and competing paradigms. As discussed in this Part, once focus is
shifted to understanding the theoretical paradigm informing the use of
reasonableness, one arrives at a precise and accurate tool to understand
jurisprudence and resolve nagging doctrinal problems.
A. Utilitarian Reasonableness: The Abacus of Negligence
Guido Calabresi called tort law “the paradigmatic law of the mixed society.”44
It deserves this unique label because of the central place of reasonableness: liability
is imposed only upon a weighing of all the “various circumstances involved . . .
without engaging in minutiae of control” of future behavior.45 It does not engage
in the outright prohibitions of risky behavior, on the one hand, and mandated
purchase of collective insurance, on the other hand; nor does it require every person
to buy insurance for the consequence of permitted behavior and otherwise
mandates that loss should lay where it falls.46 Instead, it assigns liability on the
basis of a balance between risk, its social cost, and individual responsibility.47
This Article looks in particular to the classic “Hand formula” and the tort of
negligence.48 Described as “an objective reasonableness calculus of social costs
and benefits,”49 the “Hand formula” states that “if probability be called P; the
injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L
41. See infra Part II.
42. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) (“The phrase ‘good
faith’ is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat with the context.”); Kerr
Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 491 (“Skeptics claim that the only guide to what makes an expectation of
privacy ‘reasonable’ is that five Justices say so . . . .”).
43. See supra Part III.C.
44. Guido Calabresi, Torts – The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEX. L. REV. 519, 521 (1978).
45. Id. at 529.
46. Id.
47. Cf. Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 661 (2001)
(“The reasonableness test in antitrust law, like the negligence test in tort law, rests on a balancing of the
social costs and benefits of the defendant's actions,”).
48. This Article does not claim that the entirety of tort law relies upon a utilitarian reasonableness
paradigm. It is quite likely that there are different paradigms of reasonableness at work even within the
law of torts. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1972) (focusing in particular on the tort rules governing liability for ultra-hazardous activity and
observing that there are a two paradigms of tort law, one of reciprocity defining tort liability by
reference to rights to be free from risk and the paradigm of reasonableness defining tort liability on the
basis of a utilitarian calculus). For a current discussion of the paradigm clash in tort theory, see John L.
Watts, Fairness and Utility in Products Liability: Balancing Individual Rights and Social Welfare, 38
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 597 (2011).
49. David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure
Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 250 (1996); see also Eric E. Johnson, Negligence X Factor, 2012
CARDOZO L. REV. 318 (2012).
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multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [less than] PL.”50 This formula is express in
requiring balancing—and as such is exemplary of the “paradigmatic” nature of tort
law.51 It also provides the most straight-forward metric of determining the balance:
efficiency.52 As discussed in this Part, this approach adopts a utilitarian perspective
that is both gratifyingly mechanistic and soothingly amoral.53 It hands the judge
the abacus needed to determine liability for a specific instance without needing to
make ultimate judgments on the apparent moral worth of an activity.54
1. Utilitarian Reasonableness
The central motto of utilitarian reasonableness is that size matters:
utilitarianism prescribes that one must take the action that leads to the greatest net
total utility or value.55 Thus, “ulilitarianism [sic] tells us to help those who will
most benefit—those who will gain the most.”56 Classic utilitarianism considered
that pleasure was the unit of utility.57 It further considered that pleasure and pain
could be measured on the same scale, i.e., that it is possible to subtract pain done to
a person from the pleasure gained by another by simple arithmetic.58
Consequently, the conduct that yielded the most net pleasure after all pleasure has
been added up and all pain has been subtracted is the reasonable conduct in which
to engage.59
The core benefit of classic utilitarian analysis is that it is essentially value
neutral or amoral.60 It does not ascribe any inherent value to certain conduct, as
such.61 Virtuous conduct is not good simply because it is virtuous; it is good

50. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
51. See Calabresi supra note 44.
52. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on
Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1154 (2000) (summarizing Judge Posner’s long-standing
argument “that cost-benefit analysis in the Kaldor-Hicks sense,” equating efficiency with wealth
maximization, “is both a useful method of evaluating the common law and the implicit method (implicit,
for example, in the Learned Hand formula for determining negligence) by which common-law cases are
in fact decided—and rightly so in my opinion,”).
53. This of course has also been a major basis for its criticism. See, e.g., Robin Paul Malloy, The
Political Economy of Co-Financing America’s Urban Renaissance, 40 VAND. L. REV. 67, 120 n. 199
(1987) (“Posner's analysis has become too confined by amoral principles of wealth maximization and
utilitarian cost-benefit analysis.”).
54. See Guido Calabresi, Toward a Unified Theory of Torts, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 1-2 (2007).
55. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2
(Hafner Publ’g Co. 1948) (1838); see also SIDGWICK, supra note 35, at 23-38 (discussing the concept of
reasonableness and its relationship to utilitarianism).
56. Mark S. Stein, Nussbaum: A Utilitarian Critique, 50 B.C. L. REV. 489, 490 (2009).
57. See David O. Brink, Mill’s Ambivalence About Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1672 (2010).
58. BENTHAM,, supra note 55, at 1; JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 11 (1879) (“The creed
which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that
actions are right in proportion as they tend to produce happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness pain,
and the privation of pleasure,”).
59. MILL, supra note 58, at 11.
60. See C. Edwin Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal
Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1041 (1980).
61. See, e.g., BENTHAM supra note 55, at 12.
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because it makes the larger community happier than the alternative.62 Because
happiness could be measured on a single scale, there is a common denominator
across value systems that would permit a person to make and defend a social choice
quite apart from their own moral beliefs by reference to the resulting increase in
general utility at large if it were chosen.63 In this sense, utilitarianism is a moral
system that inherently lends itself to balancing tests premised upon
reasonableness.64
The amoral nature of classic utilitarianism also gives rise to one of its
frequently cited problems: accounting for the value of torture or economic or
majoritarian unfairness.65 Assume that society as a whole feels more pleasure (in
the form of a greater sense of security) in torturing terror suspects than those few
(innocent) suspects feel the pain of torture. Utilitarianism, the problem goes, would
consider such torture reasonable.66 Alternatively, assume one social group would
create greater value by subjugating and exploiting a different social group. A
classic example for such conduct is Sparta: the relatively few Spartiates, or
members of the Spartan soldier class, subjugated an entire population of helots, or
indentured farm laborers, in order to create one of the most powerful, wealthy,
stable, and “perfect” city-states in antiquity.67 Utilitarianism, problematically,
would consider such exploitation reasonable.68
This problem could be mitigated, but not entirely avoided, if utilitarian
reasonableness is understood not as a casuistic prescription of action, but as a
generalizable principle or rule.69 Rather than attempting to determine a rule of

62. See, e.g., MILL supra note 58, at 25 (“[A]nd if we are told that its end is not happiness, but
virtue, which is better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be made if the hero or martyr did not
believe that it would earn others immunity from similar sacrifices?”).
63. See Leonard G. Ratner, The Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution, 12
HOFSTRA L. REV. 723,736-37 (1984) (critiquing non-utilitarians as “disclos[ing] no nonmystical source
of . . . rights, which are, in fact, derived from the [utilitarian] search for increased per capita need/want
fulfillment,”).
64. It is in part for this reason that the utilitarian paradigm of tort law classically has been dubbed
the “reasonableness paradigm.” See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 537, 542 (1972).
65. See, e.g., Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private Law,
62 DUKE L.J. 1109, 1120-21 (2013).
66. See Susan S. Kuo, Disaster Tradeoffs: The Doubtful Case for Public Necessity, 54 B.C. L. REV.
127,169 (2013); see also Robert Bejesky, The Utilitarian Rational Choice of Interrogation from a
Historical Perspective, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 327, 335-36 (2012).
67. For the historical rise of Sparta, and its dependence upon the helots, see DONALD KAGAN, THE
OUTBREAK OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 9-30 (1969). For the social standing of helots compared to
other Greek farmers at the time, see VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, THE OTHER GREEKS: THE FAMILY FARM
AND THE AGRARIAN ROOTS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 104 (1999). For the influence of Sparta on
Greek political philosophy, see e.g. SIR ERNEST BARKER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF PLATO AND
ARISTOTLE 14 (Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1959). For a discussion of a potential reconciliation of helots with
progressive utilitarian thought, see e.g. NADIA URBINATI, MILL ON DEMOCRACY: FROM THE ATHENIAN
POLIS TO REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 47-48 (2002).
68. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 179-83 (1973).
69. This distinction tracks the evolution from act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. See Brink,
supra note 57, at 1671, 1674-80 (“Act Utilitarianism: An act is right insofar as its consequences for the
general happiness are at least as good as any alternative available to the agent. Rule Utilitarianism: An
act is right insofar as it conforms to a rule whose acceptance value for the general happiness is at least as
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decision that fits specific individuals with their specific ability to feel pleasure and
pain, utilitarian ethics seeks generalizable rules.70 It assumes an average human
being.71 By focusing on the average human being, it is possible to minimize
exceptional individual sadism and predict in more general terms what conduct is
reasonable and efficient.
This turn to generalizable utilitarian rules was brought to its final conclusion
by equating the unit of utility not as pleasure but as financial value, or money.72 By
substituting money for pleasure, it is possible to focus on the average “market
price” for types of pleasure.73 It takes out of the equation the person who overpays
for a specific good or service out of irrational personal preference for that good or
service. Instead, it creates a truly universal measure of what pleasures and pains
are empirically worth.
Utilitarianism, unsurprisingly, shares much with economic analysis.74
Economic analysis looks for the most financially efficient outcome.75 Similarly,
economic analysis is not based upon the economics of the exceptional person, but
instead insures society against the consequences of being composed of average
market participants.76

great as any alternative rule available to the agent.”). For the continuing problems of this recasting of
utilitarianism, see RAWLS supra note 68, at 179-83.
70. SIDGWICK, supra note 35, at 18 (“We cannot determine the right conduct for a private individual
in a particular case, without first ascertaining the rule which it would be generally expedient to maintain
in the society of which he is a member.”); see also Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 993 (2008).
71. See, e.g., Leonard G. Ratner, The Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution,
12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 723,736-37 (1984) (“Per capita, or average, fulfillment is a theoretical concept that
does not allocate specific fulfillment shares. But it is not a fallacious or meaningless concept that
sacrifices individual fulfillment to a fictitious collective happiness. Rather it is a useful hypothesis that
identifies the fulfillment goal of the community,”).
72. See Posner, supra note 52, at 1154.
73. See Calibresi, supra note 54, at 2.
74. Oman & Solomon, supra note 65, at 1119 (describing law and economics as utilitarianism’s
“main variant”); cf. Catherine Kemp, The Uses of Abstraction: Remarks on Interdisciplinary Efforts in
Law and Philosophy, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 877n.42 (1997) (“The normative aspect of traditional Law
and Economics theory is a form of rule-utilitarianism familiar to legal scholars, wherein definite norms
for adjudication are founded on a principle of ‘wealth-maximization’ similar to the ‘pleasure
maximization’ of traditional utilitarian theories.”). Law and Economics scholars have later sought to
distance themselves from classic utilitarianism and viewing themselves as improving the utilitarian
paradigm. For a discussion of this conception of law and economics scholarship, as well as its
problems, see David Campbell, Welfare Economics for Capitalists: The Economic Consequences of
Judge Posner, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 2233 (2012).
75. Oman & Solomon, supra note 65, at 1119.
76. See id. at 1118 (“On this view, tort law should be seen in terms of safety regulation and social
insurance. A primary purpose of making tortfeasors liable is to police their conduct by imposing fines
on certain undesirable activities. The modern law-and-economics movement has pursued this basic
approach with the greatest tenacity and rigor. Money damages, on this view, force actors to fully
internalize the cost of their own decisions, pushing them toward optimal levels of investment in
precautions and the like. Even those who have not adopted the law-and-economics framework continue
to see tort law in terms of shifting losses from plaintiffs to defendants in order to achieve distributionally
desirable outcomes by, for example, transforming corporate actors into insurers for those that they
harm,”) (citations omitted).
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2. Negligence and the Utilitarian Calculus
The link between the academic analysis of the law of negligence and utilitarian
reasonableness is firmly established.77 The “Hand formula” in particular bears all
the traits of utilitarian analysis.78 It is premised not upon the inherent value of any
conduct but rather upon an economic balancing test.79 The aim of this balancing
test is social welfare maximization.80 Negligence liability is premised upon failure
to take efficient precautions, and thus the common law of negligence seeks both to
encourage efficient precaution in the future and to enforce efficient compensation
for accidents.81
The “Hand formula” follows rule-utilitarian rather than act-utilitarian logic.82
It does not require an examination of which of the parties would be, on the whole,
happier upon winning the law suit.83 Rather, the “Hand formula” seeks to establish
a rule, which if followed would maximize social welfare within the polity adopting
over time.84
The choice of utilitarianism for evaluating negligence claims makes
affirmative sense. Parties asserting negligence claims must establish a tenable
rationale for attribution of liability across substantive moral views.85 Thus, a
negligence claim with regard to an abortion procedure must make sense to both

77. See Miller & Perry Torts, supra note 2, at 331 (“the Restatement may be said to adopt an almost
unconstrained, reductionist, utilitarian-economic test for negligence.”) (footnote omitted); Ronen Perry,
Re-Torts, 59 ALA. L. REV. 987, 991-92 (2008) (“It may thus be said that the Restatement adopts an
almost unconstrained, reductionist, utilitarian/economic test for negligence.”) (footnote omitted); Watts,
supra note 48, at 635-37 (noting the utilitarian basis of the law governing design defects).
78. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 16 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1693, 1718 (1995) (“the familiar Learned Hand formula . . . is often interpreted as a utilitarian
metric of socially reasonable and unreasonable conduct.”) (footnote omitted); Richard W. Wright,
Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 143, 177-8 (2002) (“the generally
accepted view (among academics) [is] that negligence in tort law is defined by the Hand formula, which,
given its embedded impartiality and aggregation principles, is a transparently utilitarian formula.”). But
see, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV.
311, 360 (1996) (arguing that “the notion that the economic interpretation of the Hand Formula fits
American law better than the social contract conception is seriously overstated, at best,”).
79. See Posner, supra note 52, at 1154 (“I have long argued that cost-benefit analysis in the KaldorHicks sense is both a useful method of evaluating the common law and the implicit method (implicit, for
example, in the Learned Hand formula for determining negligence) by which common-law cases are in
fact decided—and rightly so in my opinion.”).
80. See Miller & Perry, supra note 2, at 328-30 (discussing reasonableness as welfare
maximization); Watts, supra note 48, at 609 (“From a utilitarian and efficiency perspective, it is not
reasonable to spend $30,000 in order to prevent $20,000 in losses.”).
81. See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the Nature of Tort
Liability, 121 YALE L.J. 142, 150 (2011) (footnote omitted); see also Miller & Perry, supra note 2, at
332. See generally Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
82. See, e.g., Posner Negligence, supra note 81, at 33 (“When the cost of accidents is less than the
cost of prevention, a rational profit-maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments to the accident
victims rather than incur the larger cost of avoiding liability,”).
83. See supra Part II.A.1.
84. Id.
85. See Calabresi, supra note 44, at 521 (“torts has always been present and significant, that it is so
today in the so-called “people's democracies,” are testimonies to the fact that purely “liberal” and purely
collective systems exist solely in the minds of theoreticians and ideologues. The world knows better,”).
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pro-choice and pro-life advocates.86 A utilitarian cost-benefit analysis seeks to take
value judgments inherent in other appraisals of the desirability of conduct—and the
associated liability rules—out of the equation and instead create a form of intuitive
arithmetic of liability that is well-suited to the intricate everyday problems that tort
law encounters.
B. Pragmatic Reasonableness: The Common Law of Contracts
Good faith in the common law of contracts expressly leaves behind the
utilitarian paradigm of reasonableness and the “Hand formula.”87 Reasonableness
in the context of the common law of contracts does not prescribe a utilitarian
diligence in the performance of a contract, but rather requires a different type of
conduct altogether.88 The reference to “reasonableness” by the tort of negligence
and the common law of contracts thus creates only an apparent common
denominator. Rather than evidencing a common denominator between torts and
contract, the different applications of the reasonableness standards reveal that there
is a diversity of paradigms currently within the common law.89
This Article focuses on the implied duty of good faith to establish the
paradigm of reasonableness followed by the common law of contracts.90 The
implied duty of good faith focuses in particular on the obligation to employ
reasonable efforts in the performance of the contract and the corresponding duty
not to act in a manner that undermines the basis of the parties’ bargain.91 This
Article confirms that this conception of good faith is rooted in modern
pragmatism.92 According to this paradigm, reasonableness is not measured by
reference to utility but by excluding clearly unreasonable behavior.93 That is to say
that pragmatic reasonableness requires a party to provide a rational basis for its

86. See generally Lucy E. Hill, Seeking Liberty’s Refuge: Analyzing Legislative Purpose under
Casey’s Undue Burden Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 365 passim (2012) (discussing recent legislative
attempts to disturb the value neutrality of tort law in the abortion setting).
87. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARV. L. REV. 369, 376, n.35 (1980).
88. See discussion supra Part II.A.
89. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). Although other sections of the
Restatement also introduce rules premised upon a good faith obligation—for instance, the rules of
interpretation of contract or promissory estoppel—section 205 is the central, most direct application of
good faith and reasonableness in the common law of contracts. See, e.g., Leon Trakman, Pluralism in
Contract Law, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1031, 1082 (2010) (“An interpretative theory of contracting holds that
the formation of contracts is determined primarily through a process of interpretation, or more
expansively, through contract construction”). It is also the clearest example of the difference between
utilitarian reasonableness and pragmatic reasonableness. Id. at 1068-75.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981).
92. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Cowboy Contracts: The Arizona Supreme Court’s Grand Tradition of
Transactional Fairness, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 191, 201 (2008) (“Reliance on the Restatement . . . aligns the
court with the progressive moderation, realism and pragmatism of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts . . . ,”).
93. Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith – Its Recognition and Conceptualization,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 818-21 (1982).
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actions given the contract.94 This rational basis ultimately is measured not by an
absolute standard, but by reference to relevant community standards.95
As discussed in this Part, the pragmatic reasonableness of the implied duty of
good faith enables courts to adopt a perspective that is responsive to commercial
needs and adaptive to changes in the environment of the transactions concerned. It
hands the judge a tool to dispense commercially relevant decisions that protect the
typical risk allocations between business partners in similar transactions. The
implied duty of good faith thus creates a space in which parties can form long-term
expectations in their bargains based upon their business judgment rather than their
intimate knowledge of the law.
1. Reasonableness in Pragmatism
Pragmatism originated as an American school of philosophy in the late-19th
and early-20th centuries.96 It had an important influence on the development of U.S.
jurisprudence.97 The chief unifying theme of pragmatism was a deeply held
empiricism98 that informed the critical study of social structures, including the
common law.99 Pragmatism has four classical elements. First, “inquiries should be
instrumental in that the inquiry should be most concerned with its effects, i.e. what
will be the consequence of this decision?”100 Second, pragmatic inquiry denies the
means/end dichotomy in the sense that “the logic of pragmatic inquiry was the
means and the end, all at the same time.”101 Third, it similarly denies the validity
of a facts/value dualism because “facts” themselves are linguistic representations of
social (truth) values.102 Finally, it is anti-foundational in the sense that hypotheses
94. Corporate law scholarship recently conceptualized of the pragmatic paradigm of reasonableness
as requiring a showing of a rational basis. See Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the
Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV.
398, 402 (2007); see generally Lori McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine, 4
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 521 (2013).
95. See, e.g., Cibran v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 375 F.Supp.2d 1355, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (using
pricing decisions by local gas stations to establish standards for good faith actions).
96. Justin Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in Contemporary Legal
Analysis, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565, 579 (2007); see also Summers Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra
note 20, at 865-66.
97. See Summers, supra note 20, at 865-66.
98. See id.; Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Empiricism, Experimentalism, and Conditional
Theory, 67 SMU L. REV. 141, 178 (2014) (“Philosophical pragmatism allows us to focus on what new
governance and legal empiricism offer for a new legal realism while noting the limits they must confront
in asking how law is applied and changes. Philosophical pragmatism recognizes that all our choices are
conditional; they depend upon the existing conditions in society. Empirically grounded, philosophical
pragmatism calls for a new legal realism that explores variation to build conditional legal theory.
Problem-centered, such a new legal realism must grapple with comparative analysis of the tradeoffs of
institutional choices in light of the empirical evidence, experimentalist trial and error, and the dynamics
and potential perversities of participation and collective action. Critically reflexive, such a new legal
realism pursues an emergent analytics. Fallibilistic, it encourages experiment stimulated by uncertainty.
We elaborate on these ideas below,”). See generally John C. P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and
Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640 passim (2012).
99. See supra notes 96-98.
100. Desautels-Stein, supra note 96, at 580.
101. Id.at 581.
102. Id. at 581-82.

2014]

REASON AND REASONABLENESS

87

and decisions for pragmatists “are constantly and continually open to question and
revision: good decisions will be decisions that are the most useful” in their given
context.103
The currently leading version of pragmatism is the sociology of
communicative action developed by Jürgen Habermas.104 Reasonableness for
Habermas consists of two related elements: first, “[a]n assertion can be called
rational only if the speaker satisfies the conditions necessary to achieve the
illocutionary goal of reaching an understanding about something in the world with
at least one other participant in communication.”105 Second, a “goal directed action
can be rational only if the actor satisfies the conditions necessary for realizing his
intention to intervene successfully in the world.”106
Critically, someone must be able, “when criticized, [to] provide grounds for it
by pointing to appropriate evidence” supporting his statement.107 Moreover, in the
context of rule establishment, he or she when criticized must be able “to justify his
action by explicating the given situation in light of legitimate expectations.”108
Communicative action “has a deliberative or transformative dimension.”109 Its
transformative dimension is to create truly common goals through

103. Id. at 582-83.
104. See generally 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1984) [hereinafter Habermas Theory]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT UND
GELTUNG (1998) [hereinafter Habermas Law]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, KOMMUNIKATIVES HANDELN UND
DETRANSZENDENTALISIERTE VERNUNFT (2001) [hereinafter Habermas Reason].
For a succinct
summary of Jürgen Habermas’ pragmatics and legal theory, see David M. Rasmussen, Jurisprudence
and Validity, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1059 (1996). This version of pragmatism has influenced Cass
Sunstein, Bruce Ackerman, Adeno Addis, and Robert Post among others. Jonathan Weinberg, The
Right to be Taken Seriously, 67 MIAMI L. REV. 149, 171-72 (2012) (“[Habermas’s conception of
communicative action] is front-and-center in the work of Cass Sunstein and Bruce Ackerman. It is the
basis for Robert Post's description of democracy as resting on citizens' being able to participate in those
modes of communication.”) (footnotes omitted); see generally Cass Sunstein, Group Judgments:
Statistical Means, Deliberation and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (2005) (proposing
improvements to Habermas’ deliberative process by using information markets in the deliberative
process); Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 109
(2000) (“[I]nstitutions should be designed to ensure that when shifts are occurring, it is not because of
arbitrary or illegitimate constraints on the available range of arguments. This is a central task of
constitutional design. In this light, a system of checks and balances might be explained, not as an
undemocratic check on the will of the people, but as an effort to protect against potentially harmful
consequences of group discussion.”); Sunstein Revival, supra note 35, at 1544; Bruce Ackerman & Ian
Ayres, The Secret Refund Booth, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1107, 1127-28 (2006); Bruce Ackerman,
Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 Yale L.J. 2279, 2347 (1999) (“One citation from Jürgen Habermas or
Kenneth Arrow is worth a million cites from Anthony Kennedy's law clerk.”); Adeno Addis, Role
Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1377 (1996); Robert Post, Participatory
Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 487-89 (2011) (noting the importance of
communicative action theory in the context of the First Amendment); Robert Post, Recuperating First
Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1995).
105. Habermas Theory, supra note 104, at 11; see also Rasmussen, supra note 104, at 1065-67.
106. Habermas Theory, supra note 104, at 11; see also Habermas Reason, supra note 104, at72-84
(anchoring pragmatism in a Wittgensteinian conception of grammar).
107. Habermas Theory, supra note 104, at 15; Habermas Reason, supra note 104, at 32-45; see also
Rasmussen, supra note 104, at 1065-67.
108. Habermas Theory, supra note 104, at 15; Habermas Reason, supra note 104, at 32-45.
109. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1545.
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communication.110 Communicative action is transformative precisely because it
creates a common space in which all participants have a stake despite the fact that
their initial acts and statements served the utterer’s or actor’s selfish point of
view.111 This common, public space creates normative structures that ultimately
reflect the current policy needs of the relevant community.112
Reasonableness within the communicative action paradigm thus requires two
different—yet equally important—things: in the context of a purely illocutionary
act, reasonableness speaks to the fact that a speech act is tenable. It is tenable if it
can be understood by a member of the relevant language community as addressing
a common problem.113 Thus, for example, “the bus is blue” is not a tenable
response to a question whether to expand “marriage” to include same-sex unions;
the statements, that marriage is a basic social and religious institution intended
exclusively to foster procreation and that marriage is a socially privileged
recognition of a relationship between two consenting adults that cannot be
rightfully denied to any human being on the basis of sexual orientation without
denying them equal protection, are.114 In this sense, determining the relevant
audience for the speech act will in many instances determine its reasonableness. In
the context of public deliberation, reasonableness requires a public space within
which an exchange can occur from a point of relative equality.115 A statement in
this public space is “reasonable” if it is (1) made within this public space and (2)
can be understood by others in the community as actually addressing the joint
problem for debate no matter its substantive content.
Reasonableness is not limited to speech, but also extends to action.116 In this
sense, an action is reasonable if it can be effective.117 Effectiveness in
communicative action is not measured by reference to the purely selfish intentions
of the actor, but by reference to their common space.118 Thus, an action is effective
if it achieves a problem solution and does not undermine the public space that led

110. See generally id. at 1548-55; cf. Habermas Reason, supra note 104, at 32-45.
111. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1550.
112. See Habermas Law, supra note 104, at 168-70; cf. Arthur Lupia, Yanna Krupnikov & Adam
Seth Levine, Beyond Facts and Norms: How Psychological Transparency Threatens and Restores
Deliberation’s Legitimating Potential, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 459, 465 (2013) (discussing the development
of Habermas’s theory on point in detail).
113. See Rasmussen, supra note 104, at 1065-66.
114. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693-96 (2013) (opinion of Kennedy,
J.); id. at 2706-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. See Lupia et al., supra note 112, at463-67 (2013) (“This is the circumstance that Habermas
examines. He seeks a method for generating legitimacy in the absence of a preexisting universally
accepted moral code and in the presence of positive attitudes toward the possibility of progress through
change. Habermas's thesis is that this challenge of modernity can be managed through the adoption of a
procedural intervention. He argues that ‘democratic procedure should ground the legitimacy of law.’
The procedural intervention is a form of deliberation. Habermas, quoting Frank Michelman, describes
the intervention or deliberation as ‘refer[ring] to a certain attitude toward social cooperation, namely,
that of openness to persuasion by reasons referring to the claims of others as well as one's own’”); see
generally sources cited supra note 104.
116. Habermas Theory, supra note 104, at 50.
117. Id. at 54.
118. Id. at 48.
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to its adoption.119
Reasonableness in communicative action is anchored in the social context of
each specific statement or action to assess whether viewed in that context it has a
It is a procedural paradigm rather than a substantive
rational basis.120
reasonableness paradigm. True to its pragmatic roots, it focuses on the structure of
inquiry and its effectiveness in the real world rather than supplying it with an
independent, value-based content.121 It is precisely in rejecting such a value-based
metric that it distinguishes itself from a utilitarian consequentialist philosophy,
which views utility maximization as the end value which any pragmatic structure
must ultimately serve.122
2. Common Law of Contracts and Pragmatic Reasonableness
Good faith in the common law of contracts is comparatively undertheorized.123 While it is used as a single principle, the Restatement states that the
law of contracts in fact relies upon a plurality of conceptions of good faith.124 The
Restatement directly relied upon an article by Robert Summers, which submitted
that good faith in the law of contracts lacked an independent meaning of its own
and instead served as an “excluder” of a “wide range of heterogeneous forms of
bad faith.”125 Steven Burton proposed, alternatively, that the duty of good faith
instead should be viewed as a means to recapture foregone opportunities. 126
Critically, Miller and Perry have argued that under either definition, courts
applying the duty of good faith descend into pure descriptivism: good faith no
longer is a normative standard of how people ought to perform their contracts but
merely a description of how people do.127 Using the pragmatic paradigm of
reasonableness, it is possible to resolve the confusion in prior doctrinal approaches
119. Id. at 52.
120. See generally sources cited supra notes 104-105,111.
121. See, e.g., Desautels-Stein, supra note 96, at 580-83.
122. See id.
123. See, e.g., Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 694 (“Despite the general acceptance and apparent
importance of good-faith performance in the United States, courts and scholars have not been able to
agree on the exact meaning of this concept. For many years, no attempt was made to provide clear
definitions of good faith, at least in the common law of contracts, and the doctrine was applied
somewhat intuitively. But even when courts and scholars have begun to formulate general guidelines, no
consensus has crystallized.”).
124. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205 cmts. a, d (1981).
125. Summers, supra note 93, at 818-21; see also Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968)
[hereinafter Summers General Contract Law]; see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §
205 cmt. d (1981).
126. See Burton, supra note 87. Doctrine consistently treats Professor Summers’ and Professor
Burton’s conceptualizations of good faith as the principal doctrinal works on good faith. See, e.g.,
Miller & Perry,, supra note 3, at 693-95; Emily Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A
(Nearly) Empty Vessel?, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1,4 (2005) (stating that the article “explores in some depth
the theoretical differences between the Summers/excluder-analysis and Burton/foregone-opportunities
approaches to good faith”); Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Fess, Proposed Standard for Evaluating
When the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the
Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585 (1996).
127. See Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 690-95.
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and address Miller and Perry’s criticism that the current conception of good faith in
the law of contracts is deeply flawed.128
The duty of good faith, limits the discretion of the contracting parties in
performing their contractual bargain.129 The doctrine proposes two
conceptualizations of the good faith limitation of discretion, Professor Summers’
“excluder analysis” and Professor Burton’s limitation on recapture of foregone
opportunities.130 Both approaches ultimately can be reconciled by means of the
pragmatic reasonableness paradigm that the performing party must provide a
rational basis for its actions in the specific context of the bargain struck by the
parties.131
The Restatement expressly follows the “excluder principle” in limiting abuse
of discretion of the contracting parties, rather than providing a positive duty to use
discretion in a certain manner.132 Drawing on Professor Summers’ theory, it lists
the following examples of impermissible, unreasonable action: “evasion of the
spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of
imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with or
failure to cooperate in the other party's performance.”133 This list is not exclusive,
but must be extended by factual analogy to current jurisprudence in future cases.134
Consistently with the excluder conceptualization of good faith, the Restatement
“did go on to try to articulate the general purposes of the section: that of securing
‘faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party,’ and compliance with ‘community standards of
decency, fairness or reasonableness.’”135
This account of good faith ultimately queries the rational basis for actions of
the party whose performance is alleged to be in bad faith. The action has a rational
basis if it avoids the patent examples of bad faith of the “excluder analysis.”136
That conduct is in bad faith because it can no longer be reconciled with community
standards.137 There is bad faith because any justification for one’s actions can no
longer be understood by other similarly situated persons as a valid solution to a
common problem and thus fails as an illocutionary act.138 As Professor Summers
subscribed to the pragmatic paradigm in contemporaneous writings, this
consistency of his account of good faith with pragmatic reasonableness is hardly
128. See id. at 727, 740.
129. See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917); see also Houh, supra
note 126, at 16 (noting that the case “is widely read as one of the earliest American cases to imply a
duty” of good faith).
130. See sources cited supra note 126.
131. See supra Part II.B.1.
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981); Miller & Perry, supra note 3,
at 698-702 (discussing the influence of Professor Summers’ excluder analysis); see also Houh, supra
note 126, at 30.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981).
134. See id.; Summers General Contract Law, supra note 125, at 207.
135. Summers Good Faith, supra note 96, at 821 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF CONTRACTS §
205 cmt. a (1981)).
136. See, e.g., Miller & Perry, supra note 3 at 698-702; Summers General Contract Law, supra note
125, at 206-07.
137. See, e.g., Miller & Perry, supra note 3 at 703-05..
138. See supra Part II.B.1.
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surprising.139
Professor Burton challenged and sought to refine the excluder
conceptualization of good faith.140 At its heart, Professor Burton’s argument is that
a discretion exercising party violates the duty of good faith when it “refuses to bear
the expected cost of performance.”141 The parties’ justification for its performance
becomes subjectively pre-textual because it knows that it has acted inconsistently
with the economic assumption of the bargain.142 Although Professor Burton places
an emphasis on subjective intentions to determine what the expected cost of
performance was, he admits that as a matter of proof in an actual case, cost of
performance is measured by “reasonable businesspersons . . . in the commercial
setting.”143 Professor Burton thus overlays a reasonable reliance lens to provide the
general definition of good faith in the law of contracts Professor Summers denied
existed.
The justification for the foregone opportunity analysis similarly looks to the
rational basis for the performing party’s actions. Its principal focus, however, is
not on the illocutionary question whether the justification offered for conduct
makes sense, but on effectiveness.144 Conduct lacks a rational basis because it
renders the common instrument of the parties’ intention ineffective.145 It destroyed
139. See, e.g., Summers Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 20, at 863.
140. See Burton, supra note 87, at 369-70 (“A majority of American jurisdictions, the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, and the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) now recognize the duty to perform
a contract in good faith as a general principle of contract law. The conduct of virtually any party to any
contract accordingly may be vulnerable to claims of breach stemming from this obligation. Yet neither
courts nor commentators have articulated an operational standard that distinguishes good faith
performance from bad faith performance. The good faith performance doctrine consequently appears as
a license for the exercise of judicial or juror intuition, and presumably results in unpredictable and
inconsistent applications. Repeated common law adjudication, however, has enriched the concept of
good faith performance so that an operational standard now can be articulated and evaluated.”) (citations
omitted); Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1, passim (1981) [hereinafter Burton Article 2]; Houh, supra note
126, at 30; Miller & Perry Contracts, supra note 3, at 706-12.
141. Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 706.
142. See Burton, supra note 87, at 371.
The identity of forgone opportunities is determined by an objective standard, focusing on the
expectations of reasonable persons in the position of the dependent parties. Whether a particular
discretion-exercising party acted to recapture forgone opportunities is a question of subjective intent.
The two approaches are consistent. If a discretion-exercising party uses its control to recapture a forgone
opportunity, it follows that it is not acting for a purpose within the contemplation of the parties. If such a
party acts for a reason contemplated by the parties, it is not recapturing a forgone opportunity. Supra
text accompanying note 87, at 390-91.
143. Burton Article 2, supra note 140, at 24; Compare Burton, supra note 87, at 390-91; see Miller &
Perry, supra note 3, at 710-11.
144. See supra Part II.B.1. Burton’s theory still can be explained by reference to illocutionary
reasonableness, as well. The parties express their respective economic expectations in certain contract
terms. An expectation is reasonable if other similarly situated persons would have the same
expectations upon reviewing these terms due to relevant community standards. It is thus similarly when
there is no means of reconciling the justification of a performance with the community understanding of
those terms that the economic expectations of the parties are violated and action is in bad faith. Bad
faith is thus again reducible to the failure of the justification of performance as an illocutionary act.
There is no rational basis for the performance in question.
145. See Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 706.
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the equivalent of their public space, namely their shared private space of the
bargain by impermissibly undermining their initial economic expectations.146
When addressing the question of whether a party acted in good faith in this broader
sense, one must determine whether the action is one that is effective in bringing
about the joint bargain of the parties.147 This again brings to bear community
standards but through a different lens: the question is not whether the actions of the
parties under the specific terms of the contract can be understood by other like
situated actors, but whether other like situated actors would consider that the
performance made effective the initial exchange of promises contained in the
contract.148 This is the alternative formulation of a rational basis test inherent in the
pragmatic reasonableness paradigm.149
As recent literature bears out, it ultimately does not matter which approach,
Summers’, Burton’s, or both, a court applies.150 The result under both is ultimately
the same because “all major accounts of good faith share a common denominator”:
community standards.151
In their recent article on good faith in the performance of contracts, Miller and
Perry sought to indict this paradigm of good faith as “deeply flawed.”152 Their
article proved that
[A]n action by a contracting party must be determined to be in good faith as long
as it is considered so by a single expert (in the case of common practice) or by a
single member of the community (in the case of a common view of morality). This
153
must be the case even if all other experts disagree.

They submit that this result “is not particularly desirable: it is an extremely
permissive perception of good faith that would permit any behavior considered
acceptable by a minority, no matter how small.”154 Essentially, Miller and Perry
challenge that this result is undesirable because it does not coincide with any
normative theory of law.155
The research done by Miller and Perry independently confirms that in practice,
good faith in the law of contracts uses pragmatic reasonableness. It required that
“[a]n assertion can be called rational only if the speaker satisfies the conditions
necessary to achieve the illocutionary goal of reaching an understanding about
something in the world with at least one other participant in communication.”156
This prescription overlaps completely with Miller and Perry’s conclusion.157 To be
justified in their normative criticism, Miller and Perry thus have a mighty obstacle
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
67.
157.

See Burton, supra note 87, at 385.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See, e.g., Burton, supra note 3, at 385, 390-91.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See, e.g., Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 724; Houh, supra note 126, at 33-35.
Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 724.See, e.g., Houh, supra note 126, at 33-35.
Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 727.
Id.
Id. at 740.
Id.
Habermas Theory, vol. I, supra note 104, at 11; see also Rasmussen, supra note 104, at 1065Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 740.
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to overcome—the tradition of pragmatic instrumentalism deeply embedded in
American law.158 This tradition is instrumental to the functioning of the common
law in creating a space for legal development in accordance with policy needs of
society as a whole without swinging wildly at the formation of a simple or
supermajority.159 Rather, consistent with the deliberative roots of pragmatic
inquiry, it moves upon the formation of a social consensus and only holds parties to
bargains predating its formation to such newly developed norms once it has fully
formed.160
C. Reasonableness as Equilibrium Adjustment: Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
Constitutional criminal procedure departs from the classic common law
reasonableness paradigms discussed in the previous Parts.161 What constitutes a
“reasonable” search or seizure, and whether evidence from an unreasonable search
should be excluded from evidence at a later criminal trial despite the “good faith”
of the police officer, refer to yet another rule of conduct.162 What reasonableness
means in this context consequently must be determined by yet a third paradigm
other than the utilitarian calculus of tort law and the pragmatic rational basis
inquiry of contract law.163
This Article again will focus on a specific issue in constitutional criminal
procedure, namely Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.164 The Fourth Amendment
guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”165 Because the Fourth
Amendment is silent on how it must be applied, the consequence of the right to be
secure in one’s person, houses, papers and effects therefore had to be judicially
created.166
158. See generally Summers, supra note 20 (explaining the deep roots of pragmatic instrumentalism
in U.S. law).
159. See supra Part IV.B.
160. See id. ; cf. Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 74. One area in which such a consensus crystallizes is
unconscionability in form agreements. One recent article notes, “as courts have reinvigorated
unconscionability as a policing tool for standardized agreements, they have introduced into the doctrine
a ‘sliding scale’ approach that, if properly cultivated, can empower courts, and increasingly, arbitrators,
to do what consumers, legislators, and legal scholars have yet been unable to do—control oppression
and overreaching in consumer form contracts.” Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in
Formalism – The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconsionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 5 (2012).
161. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 698 (2011) constitutional criminal procedure were
“transformed from a putative descendent of the common law to an unabashedly policy-driven doctrine”
from the Burger Court onwards); Kerr, supra note 22, at 492 (a principled approach to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in the form of “equilibrium adjustment differs from general common law in
evolution of constitutional law in a significant way”).
162. See sources cited supra note 161.
163. See supra Part II.C.2.
164. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath of affirmation and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
165. Id.
166. Laurin, supra note 161, at 690.
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In his recent article, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, Professor Orin Kerr proposes that a rights-based theory does permit
one to uncover an underlying coherence and consistency in the apparently jumbled
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.167 His theory roots reasonableness in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in a contemporary, sophisticated formalism: American
Tracing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence historically,
constructivism.168
Professor Kerr explains that new technology brings about a facial conflict between
different constitutional values of privacy and security.169 The reasonableness of
police conduct is determined by bringing these values to a reflective equilibrium
established by comparing the current circumstances to the ideal balance between
these values in a hypothetical Year Zero.170 This hypothetical Year Zero assumes
that neither police nor criminals have any technological tools at their disposal to
commit or investigate crime.171
As discussed in this Part, this approach adopts a perspective that protects
fundamental social and political values. It hands the judge a tool to correct even
prevalent conduct by reference to legal first principles. It thus creates a strong and
dependable normative system that provides a bulwark against unwanted social
change.
1. Reasonableness in Constructivist Formalism
Attacking formalism is a favorite stalking horse for legal scholars.172 Although

167. Kerr, supra note 22, passim.
168. See cf. Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1146 (1999)
[hereinafter Leiter] (“A sophisticated formalist like Ronald Dworkin, who has a rich theory of legal
reasoning, still remains within the formalist camp because he sees the law as rationally determinate and
he denies that judges have strong discretion (i.e., he denies that their decisions are not bound by
authoritative legal standards),”).
169. Kerr, supra note 22, at 485.
170. Although associated with an originalist point of view, Professor Kerr has rightfully defended his
position as essentially constructivist. See generally Christopher Slobogin, An Original Take on
Originalism, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 14, 14 (2011) (“At bottom, equilibrium-adjustment theory is
originalism, and thus suffers from all of the problems associated with that methodology.”); Orin S. Kerr,
Defending Equilibrium-Adjustment, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 84, 85 (2011) (“Equilibrium-adjustment is
not originalism. It is a theory of maintaining the status quo balance of power, not an effort to restore
eighteenth-century rules. That understanding explains why living constitutionalists and pragmatists alike
have embraced equilibrium-adjustment, and why the chief attack on it has been launched on originalist
grounds.”).
171. Kerr, supra note 22, at 485.
172. See, e.g., Glenn S. Koppel, The Functional and Dysfunctional Role of Formalism in Federalism:
Shady Grove Versus Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 930 (2012) (“Formalism is a
jurisprudential stepchild of the legal academy, and the term is frequently used as a pejorative.”);
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 509-10 (1988) (“With accelerating frequency, legal
decisions and theories are condemned as ‘formalist’ or ‘formalistic.’ But what is formalism, and what is
so bad about it? Even a cursory look at the literature reveals scant agreement on what it is for decisions
in law, or perspectives on law, to be formalistic, except that whatever formalism is, it is not good.”).
For a recent example, see, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, New Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing
Crisis, 93 B.U. L. REV. 389, passim (2013) (warning of the consequences of a literalist approach to
mortgage assignments).
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the term has had a revival of sorts, it is still not consistently defined.173 For
purposes of this Article, the term formalism refers to any legal theory that meets
three criteria common to the term’s typical usage. First, formalism submits that
every legal question is capable of a legal solution.174 Second, it posits that there is
only one right outcome to any legal dispute.175 Third, it argues that this solution
will be revealed by following the internal logic from first principles to their
mandated conclusions.176
Constructivism is one of the most “sophisticated” types of contemporary
formalism.177 It submits that every dispute is equally susceptible to a legal
solution.178 Constructivism argues that there is only one legal solution to any
case,179and arrives at this conclusion by treating the law as a seamless web
premised upon strong first principles.180
Constructivism is a soft and sophisticated sort of formalism because it is
173. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1397 (1999) (defining formalist as “rule-based decision making” but proposing
that “[t]he new formalism is instead best viewed as a pragmatic approach to judicial foreign relations
doctrines”) (emphasis added).
174. See, e.g., Schauer Formalism, supra note 172, at 511-12.
175. See, e.g., Schauer Formalism, supra note 172, at 511-12 (“We condemn Lochner as formalistic
not because it involves a choice, but because it attempts to describe this choice as compulsion.”);
Summers Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 20, at 867.
176. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1748 (1976) [hereinafter Kennedy] (“The rules that governed conduct depended neither on legislative
consensus nor on a utopian morality, but on deduction from first principles acceptable to everyone. They
were applied without the exercise of discretion by judges who had no power to inject their own politics
or morals into the process.”); Summers Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 20, at 867; cf. Schauer
Formalism, supra note 172, at 512, 514. This approach differs from Professor Schauer’s definition of
formalism by treating decisions made according to legal principles, rather than legal rules, as formalist
so long as they hold that there is only one correct manner in which to apply the principle in any given
case. I differ from Professor Schauer’s account because formalism would have to posit, according to an
applicable legal principle, what the “the most locally applicable legal norm” is. Schauer Formalism,
supra note 172, at 522. This precisely will permit the use of one of the escape routes Schauer treats as
non-formalist (so long as the principle requires the otherwise applicable rule to be displaced for a
different, specific rule). This conception of formalism is on the whole more consistent with the
“scientific” nature of the law attacked by Kennedy and, much earlier, Holmes, Cardozo, and Llewellyn.
Kennedy, supra at 1747-49.
177. Leiter, supra note 168, at 1146-47 (“A sophisticated formalist like Ronald Dworkin, who has a
rich theory of legal reasoning, still remains within the formalist camp because he sees the law as
rationally determinate and he denies that judges have strong discretion (i.e., he denies that their
decisions are not bound by authoritative legal standards). Some have thought that Dworkin denies the
‘autonomy‘ of legal reasoning, but this accusation is patently question-begging: Dworkin's claim is
precisely that the moral considerations that ultimately fix a party's legal rights are themselves part of the
law. Dworkin simply has a richer picture of the class of legal reasons than other formalists--indeed, too
rich for some formalists. Justice Scalia, for example, thinks that for judging to be genuinely mechanical
(per the formalist's ideal), the interpretive principles that are part of the class of legal reasons must be
austerely simple, lest discretion sneak into adjudication under the guise of ‘interpretation.’”).
178. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 333-54 (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin Empire]; see RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 114-23 (1977) [hereinafter Dworkin Rights]; Ronald Dworkin,
In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 359 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin Theory].
179. See Dworkin Empire, supra note 178, at 345-54; Dworkin Rights, supra note 178, at 114-23.
180. See Dworkin Empire, supra note178, at 347-49 (explaining that the law operates as a seamless
web); Dworkin Theory, supra note 178, at 359 (same).
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premised upon the coherent application of a legal principle—fundamental rights—
rather than the mechanical application of “the most locally applicable” legal rule.181
Constructivism further posits the fundamental right that “[e]ach person possesses
an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole
cannot override.”182
This principle of justice is codified in a social contract agreed upon from an
analytic original position of equality.183 The terms of the just social contract are
agreed upon from a position of ignorance of one’s future or potential position in
society by means of rational choice.184 In agreeing upon terms, rational choice
requires adoption of the most efficient terms.185 In a situation where there are
several equally efficient proposals, the proposal most benefiting the least favored
group in society wins.186
The rational choice of justice is tested against a reflective equilibrium,187
which is needed “to see if the principles which would be chosen would match our
considered convictions of justice or extend them in an acceptable way.”188 It
operates by “working from both ends” our moral intuitions and rational choice
from the vantage point of positional ignorance, meaning that if any rule results in a
conflict between our moral intuitions and the original position, one or the other
must be modified.189 By altering contractual conditions, withdrawing judgments,
and conforming to principle, the rational choice of justice theory proposes that
“eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses
reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments
duly pruned and adjusted.”190
The reflective equilibrium balances the totality of relevant countervailing
commitments to create a seamless normative web191 that reflects “existing political
rights.”192 These “[p]olitical rights are creatures of both history and morality: what
181. Dworkin Rights, supra note 178; (setting out constructivist method in jurisprudence); accord
Rawls Justice, supra note 68, at 7, 63 (explaining constructivist method in U.S. liberal political theory);
see also Schauer Formalism, supra note 172, at 509-10 (discussing same).
182. Rawls Justice, supra note 68, at 3. Dworkin’s deep theory of rights is “[b]ased on Rawls’ social
contract theory.” Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of
Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367, 431-32 (2013). If anything, Ronald
Dworkin embraces the method of the reflective equilibrium discussed below more aggressively than
Rawls did. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 262-65 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2011).
183. Rawls Justice, supra note 68, at 84 (“[S]ociety is interpreted as a cooperative venture for mutual
advantage. The basic structure is a public system of rules defining a scheme of activities that leads men
to act together so as to produce a greater sum of benefits and assigns to each certain recognized claims
to a share in the proceeds.”).
184. See generally id.at 95-100, 136-150 (explaining choice from the Rawlsian original position).
185. See id.at 67 (“[A] distribution of goods or scheme of production is inefficient when there are
ways of doing still better for some individuals without doing any worse for others.”).
186. See generally id.at 75-83 (discussing efficiency and choice between equally efficient proposals).
187. Id. at 20 (“It is an equilibrium because at last our principles and judgments coincide; and it is
reflective since we know to what principles our judgments conform and the premises of their
derivation.”).
188. Id. at 19.
189. Id. at 20.
190. Id.
191. See generally Dworkin Empire, supra note 178, at 333-54 (discussing legal decisionmaking).
192. Dworkin Hard Cases, supra note 35, at 1063.
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an individual is entitled to have, in civil society, depends upon both the practice
and the justice of its political institutions.” This means that while “judges must
make fresh judgments about the rights of the parties who come before them . . .
these political rights reflect, rather than oppose, political decisions of the past.”193
Thus, the choice within the reflective equilibrium is to find the decision that best
takes account of each political right and is consistent with all of them.194
Constructivism submits that its rights-based balancing test must be supported
by an “overlapping consensus” of “comprehensive” moral and political
philosophies and ideologies. Furthermore, this overlapping consensus requires that
the reflective equilibrium that results must be consistent with all reasonable moral,
religious, or political points of view—be it for different reasons internal to each
moral, religious, or political point of view given that these comprehensive moral,
religious, and political points of view must coexist in a pluralist society.195 In
short, the balancing test of the reflective equilibrium does not claim to subscribe to
a particular ideological point of view but to be broadly consistent with any
ideological position.196
The concept of reasonableness in constructivism is one of civic, reciprocal, and
full cooperation. It requires more than the rational basis required by pragmatic
reasonableness. Rather than providing an acceptable rational basis for one’s
actions, constructivist reasonableness requires individuals to propose and accept
“fair terms of cooperation.”197 A term is only “fair” if it perfectly reflects the
cooperative values of the fundamental rights at the center of the formalist legal
system.198 Put differently, while there may be a rational basis to disagree with
these values, or the rules premised upon them, such disagreement is relegated to the
realm of political choice rather than legal judgment.199
2. The Constructivism of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
Professor Kerr’s recent Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment demonstrates that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence adopts a

193. Id.
194. See id. at 1093-96.
195. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 149-80 (Columbia Univ. Press, 2005)
[hereinafter Rawls Liberalism] (discussing the concept of an overlapping consensus and its importance
in changing original Rawlsian political theory from A Theory of Justice).
196. See generally id.at 149-80 (discussing the relationship between the reflective equilibrium and an
overlapping consensus).
197. Id. at 86.
198. See generally Dworkin Empire, supra note 178, at 333-54.
199. See Dworkin Hard Cases, supra note 35, at 1063 (“The rights thesis, that judicial decisions
enforce existing political rights, suggests an explanation that is more successful on both counts. If the
thesis holds, then institutional history acts not as a constraint on the political judgment of judges but as
an ingredient of that judgment, because institutional history is part of the background that any plausible
judgment about the rights of an individual must accommodate. Political rights are creatures of both
history and morality: what an individual is entitled to have, in civil society, depends upon both the
practice and the justice of its political institutions. So the supposed tension between judicial originality
and institutional history is dissolved: judges must make fresh judgments about the rights of the parties
who come before them, but these political rights reflect, rather than oppose, political decisions of the
past.”).
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constructivist reasonableness paradigm.200 As Professor Kerr discusses, the
constructivist paradigm organizes current jurisprudence to reveal that “[w]hile
existing doctrine is complex and fact-specific, it is not at all a ‘mess’”201 as
previously presumed.
a. Constructivist Reasonableness as Fourth Amendment Paradigm
In keeping with constructivist methodology, Professor Kerr’s theory begins in
a hypothetical world of “Year Zero,” which “represents an imaginary time, a sort of
beginning of the universe for criminal investigations.”202 This analytical original
position displays the countervailing commitments that must be balanced for police
to investigate crime and for courts to limit police power and avoid abuses.203 The
original balance permits police to “conduct surveillance in public, and speak with
suspects, victims, or eyewitnesses” and to “walk the beat and observe whatever
they see in public.”204 Based on this work they can gather probable cause to
“detain a person” and “obtain warrants and make arrests.”205 Furthermore,
warrants “must only allow the government to search particular places for particular
evidence: no ‘general’ warrants are permitted.”206
Thus, “the Fourth Amendment in Year Zero strikes a balance between security
and privacy,” if perhaps not perfectly.207 What is important is that “Year Zero
strikes a stable balance of power to enforce the law.”208 In constructivist terms, it
creates political rights that can be reduced to principle and applied coherently and
consistently over time: a principled translation of the balance to new facts and
circumstances is possible and does not descend into arbitrary policy-preference.209
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence only appears in disarray because of the
effect of constant technological advancement on the balance struck in the
hypothetical Year Zero position. Such developments “threaten the privacy/security
balance because they enable both cops and robbers to accomplish tasks they
couldn’t before, or else to do old tasks more easily or cheaply than before.”210

200. See Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 481, 490-91 (“Equilibrium-adjustment plays two roles
in this framework. The primary role is to guide the transition from the principles layer of doctrine to the
application layer of doctrine. Equilibrium-adjustment directs how courts can choose among the various
options permitted by the open-ended principles of Fourth Amendment law. In a sense, equilibriumadjustment is the principle that governs the application of the principles layer: it guides how courts go
from the general principles of Fourth Amendment law to the concrete, fact-specific rules that make up
Fourth Amendment doctrine more generally. As a result, equilibrium-adjustment is both outside Fourth
Amendment doctrine and also a driving force behind it.”).
201. Id. at 481.
202. Id.at 483.
203. Id. at 484.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 484.
206. Id. at 484-85.
207. Id. at 485.
208. Id.
209. See generally Dworkin Hard Cases, supra note 35, at 1093-96.
210. Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 486-87 (giving use of flashlights by police as one example
of technological change that led to Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in U.S. v. Lee, 274
U.S. 559, 563 (1927) and Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) and the use of the telephone by
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Once the effect of technological change is factored into judicial decision-making, it
becomes apparent that courts are simply trying to maintain the Year Zero balance
of privacy/security under new circumstances rather than make or change policy.211
Kyllo v. United States212 is the paradigmatic case for Equilibrium
Adjustment.213 The government in Kyllo suspected that Danny Kyllo was growing
marijuana in his home, a process requiring significant heat from high-intensity
lamps.214 From the passenger seat of a car parked across the street from the house,
two United States agents pointed an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to
scan the heat signature of the house and detected that “the roof over the garage and
a side wall of [the] petitioner's home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the
home and substantially warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex.”215 On the
basis of the thermal imaging, as well as tips from informants and utility bills, “a
Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of [the] petitioner's
home, and the agents found an indoor growing operation involving more than 100
plants.”216 Mr. Kyllo entered a guilty plea after losing his efforts to suppress the
evidence obtained at his home.217 After an initial successful appeal requiring the
trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the intrusiveness of the thermal
imaging technology used, the district court again did not suppress the evidence
obtained from the initial search and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit confirmed the ruling because the petitioner “had shown no subjective
expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat
escaping from his home. Even if he had . . . there was no objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy because the thermal imager did not expose any intimate
details of Kyllo's life, only amorphous hot spots on the roof and exterior.”218
The United States Supreme Court in a majority decision authored by Justice
Scalia disagreed with the Ninth Circuit. Centrally, it reasoned that searching the
interior of a home by whatever means is reasonable only if it complies with the
“ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of
privacy . . . .”219 It deduced from this principle that “obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the home's interior that could not otherwise
have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area,’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is
not in general public use.”220 It explained that to “withdraw protection of this
minimum expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment” because it would undercut the “degree of
criminals to meet with co-conspirators as another such example in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438
(1928)).
211. See id. at 488.
212. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
213. Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 496 (“An easy starting point is Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Kyllo v. United States . . . .”).
214. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
215. Id. at 29-30.
216. Id. at 30.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 31.
219. Id. at 34-35; Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 497-98.
220. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
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privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.”221
Professor Kerr uses Kyllo as the paradigmatic case for Equilibrium Adjustment
because it expressly adopted a balancing approach to constitutional interpretation
that applies a fundamental principle to novel facts.222 This application facially
departed from the rule announced in prior jurisprudence and faithfully applied by
the Ninth Circuit in Kyllo.223 In constructivist terms, the “original position”
reflected in the Court’s prior reasonable-expectation-of-privacy jurisprudence had
to be adjusted because it no longer was consistent with existing value judgments of
the reflective equilibrium.224 In other words, because of technological change,
prior jurisprudence no longer was consistent with the political right to privacy
underlying the constitutional order to be interpreted and thus require a change in
jurisprudence.225 Professor Kerr then traces the same constructivist method
through recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as a constant thread holding these
decisions together.226
Equilibrium adjustment, like constructivism, is supported by an overlapping
consensus of different comprehensive political and moral ideologies.227 Its
adoption by Justice Scalia to defend privacy rights against the traditional reception
of the Bill of Rights certainly support that claim: it is precisely the method used by
living constitutionalists to defend the Court’s decision to defend privacy rights
against the traditional reception of the Fourteenth Amendment in Roe v. Wade and
its progeny.228 In other words, the adoption of constructivism by jurists
traditionally associated with an originalist position perforce supports the existence
of an overlapping consensus—within the narrowly tailored area within which
originalists agree to its use.
The consequence of Equilibrium Adjustment is that through a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” and other “reasonableness” tests, reasonableness can be
expressed in terms of civic, reciprocal and full cooperation. Like the Rawlsian
observation that “it is by the reasonable that we enter as equals the public world of
others and stand ready to propose, or to accept, as the case may be, fair terms of
cooperation with them,”229 Professor Kerr proposes that equilibrium adjustment
“facilitates the coherence of group decisionmaking.”230 Using constructivist
theory, it is possible to define what “reasonable” means: the case-by-case rule that
can be expressed as substantively fair terms of cooperation between the
government’s exercise of its police powers and the general population’s privacy
221. Id.
222. See Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 498.
223. See, e.g., Heather K. McShain, Not Quite Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451: The Uncertain Future of
Sense-Enhancing Technology in the Aftermath of United States v. Kyllo, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 3, 51
(2002).
224. See Rawls Justice, supra note 68, at 20; see generally discussion supra Part II.C.1.
225. See Dworkin Empire, supra note 178, at 333-54; see generally discussion supra PartII.C.1.
226. See generally Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 499-525.
227. See id.at 488.
228. For a full historical discussion, see William N. Eskridge, Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002).
229. Rawls Liberalism, supra note 195, at 86.
230. Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 533-35.
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rights. The “exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe
that the reasons we offer for our political actions may reasonably be accepted by
other citizens as justification for those actions”231 because they would agree that the
balance between privacy and security is appropriately struck. We would agree that
it is appropriately struck when the resulting rule seems fair to a disinterested
rational person considering its fairness both from the point of view of the
(potentially erroneously) accused as well as the victim.
Constructivist reasonableness further differs starkly from its utilitarian and
pragmatic cousins. As Professor Kerr explains, constructivist reasonableness aims
“to restore the status quo ante, not serve as an instrument of change.”232 This is
diametrically opposed to paradigms of reasonableness that seek to “ensure that the
law reflects the ‘felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, [and] intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious.’”233 Rather than
seeking to be an instrument of change to adapt the law to new circumstances,
constructivist reasonableness “is a kind of ‘command theory’—a theory of
interpretation seeking guidance from prior historical moment—rather than a theory
of legal evolution. This is different from most concepts of common law reasoning
in constitutional law.”234
b. Constructivist Reasonableness and the Good Faith Exception
The constructivist reasonableness paradigm also underpins the meaning of
“good faith” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.235 “Good faith” is relevant to
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when a court finds there to have been an illegal
search and must determine whether the evidence gathered in the illegal search can
nevertheless be admitted into evidence during a criminal trial.236 The Supreme
Court introduced the good faith exception in 1986 in United States v. Leon237 to
answer “whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so
as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by
officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and

231. Rawls Liberalism, supra note 195, at 35.
232. Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 493.
233. Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 492 (quoting Holmes Common Law, supra note 30, at 1).
234. Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 493.
235. Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 494-95. Interestingly, Professor Kerr also notes to the
contrary that “the remedies for Fourth Amendment violations have fluctuated significantly over time
and have not reflected equilibrium-adjustment.” Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 495. In those
cases, Professor Kerr proposes that a further split of “reasonableness” within Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is necessary: equilibrium reasonableness for the question whether a search has occurred
and application of “a reasonableness [that] reflects a contemporary policy judgment rather than an effort
to reach some prior equilibrium” for remedies. Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 495-96. With
regard to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, this is not a compelled conclusion. The logic
of the court in establishing this exception and later expanding it follows largely the same reasoning as
the one laid bare in Equilibrium. See Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 4; Caleb Mason, New Police
Surveillance Technologies and the Good Faith Exception: Warrantless GPS Tracker Evidence After
United States v. Jones, 13 NEV. L.J. 60, 68-72 (2012) (discussing the link between equilibrium
adjustment and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).
236. See Mason, supra note 235, at 68-72.
237. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.”238
The Court premised its conclusion on the observation that “[w]hether the
exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case, our decisions
make clear, is ‘an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment
rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.’”239
This separate question “must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of
preventing the use in the prosecution's case in chief of inherently trustworthy
tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and
neutral magistrate that ultimately is found to be defective.”240 When police officers
act “in objective good faith” (i.e., objectively reasonably), the Court noted, “the
magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants [by permitting
application of the exclusionary rule] offends basic concepts of the criminal justice
system.”241
The development of the good faith exception since Leon is only consistent
with the constructivist paradigm of reasonableness and inconsistent with
utilitarianism or pragmatism. In Illinois v. Krull,242 the Supreme Court extended
the good faith exception to reasonable reliance by police officers upon a state
statute permitting warrantless administrative searches.243 In Arizona v. Evans,244
the Supreme Court extended the good faith exception to clerical errors by the court
in the logging of an arrest warrant that had in fact been quashed unbeknownst to an
arresting police officer relying upon the computer record.245 In Herring v. United
States,246 the exception was extended again to innocent police clerical errors.247
Finally, in Davis v. United States,248 the exception was extended to a situation
where police had relied, “to the letter,” upon binding appellate precedent that was
later overturned by the Supreme Court.249
All of these cases are consistent with constructivist reasonableness. The
original privacy/security equilibrium has to be adjusted for the complex modern
apparatus for the administration of criminal justice. The clerical errors at issue in
Arizona v. Evans and Herring v. United States have the most direct link to
technological change: computer record keeping error.250 Illinois v. Krull concerned
238. Id. at 900.
239. Id. at 906.
240. Id. at 906-07.
241. Id. at 908.
242. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
243. Id.
244. 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
245. Id.
246. 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
247. Id.
248. 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011).
249. Id. at 2428 (“At the time of the search at issue here, we had not yet decided Arizona v. Gant, and
the Eleventh Circuit had interpreted our decision in New York v. Belton, to establish a bright-line rule
authorizing the search of a vehicle's passenger compartment incident to a recent occupant's arrest. The
search incident to Davis's arrest in this case followed the Eleventh Circuit's Gonzalez precedent to the
letter. Although the search turned out to be unconstitutional under Gant, all agree that the officers'
conduct was in strict compliance with then-binding Circuit law and was not culpable in any
way.”(citations omitted)).
250. Evans, 514 U.S. at 4; Herring, 555 U.S. at 137.
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the balance of administrative searches, a development that responded to
commercial and technological change in its own right.251 Davis v. United States
was brought about because of the need for appellate courts to interpret, and police
to apply, Supreme Court jurisprudence on automobile searches – an independent
change to the Year Zero balance.252 The good faith exception in all these cases
captures a necessary condition for the administration of justice according to the
original privacy/security balance to function in current practice. Without it,
technological change in the administration of justice (rather than investigation of
crime) and inefficiencies in judicial reaction to technological change would of
necessity skew the balance in favor of privacy and against security. Law
enforcement officers would have to become data management experts and Supreme
Court justices swami because they could not rely upon the tools and departmental
guidance with which they were provided to do their jobs.
This classification of good faith explains how the Court can insist how the
exception can both rest upon objective good faith and apply a culpability of
conduct test to determine it.253 If an officer were to act dishonestly, the action
would not be in good faith because the person in the hypothetical original position
would not accept the purported justification of the officer for his actions. The
conduct would be “culpable.”254 However, a law enforcement officer could not
objectively rely upon an executive order suspending the Fourth Amendment
entirely even if the officer honestly believed he or she had to act within its
confines.255 The conduct would be culpable in the sense the term is used in
jurisprudence because it is “grossly negligent” or no longer reconcilable with a
reasonable good faith belief by the law enforcement officer that his or her conduct
is lawful.256 The analysis is objective because it looks to the reasonable police
officer from the position of the ideal balance of security/privacy as applied to an
imperfect world and is justified by its terms.
The development of the good faith exception is notably inconsistent with other
reasonableness paradigms. For instance, a utilitarian analysis would have focused
on the police officer’s diligence. Adapting the Hand formula, the question would
have been what the cost of remedying the mistake would have been compared to
the cost of the harm times the probability of its occurrence.257 This analysis could
have yielded the same results in all but one of the extensions of the good faith
exception: Herring v. United States.258
251. Krull, 480 U.S. at 356-57.
252. See generally Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419.Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 493.
253. See id. at 2427-28.
254. See id.
255. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50 (“Unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be
expected to question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law.”).
256. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28.
257. See supra Part II.A.2.
258. 555 U.S. 135, 138 (2009) (“But when Morgan went to the files to retrieve the actual warrant to
fax to Pope, Morgan was unable to find it. She called a court clerk and learned that the warrant had been
recalled five months earlier. Normally when a warrant is recalled the court clerk's office or a judge's
chambers calls Morgan, who enters the information in the sheriff's computer database and disposes of
the physical copy. For whatever reason, the information about the recall of the warrant for Herring did
not appear in the database. Morgan immediately called Pope to alert her to the mixup, and Pope
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In Herring, a utilitarian analysis would have come to a different conclusion
because the arresting officer acted on the basis of a computer entry before his office
received a fax confirmation of the warrant it had expressly requested.259 In
Herring, the police officer in question learned that a person who was “no stranger
to law enforcement” sought to retrieve an item from an impounded truck and
requested his warrant clerk to check whether there were outstanding warrants for
the man’s arrest.260 Finding no such warrants in his own county, the investigator
again asked his warrant clerk to check for warrants in the adjacent county.261
Computer records incorrectly showed there to be an outstanding warrant, leading
the investigator to arrest the man and search him for contraband (successfully)
before receiving a fax confirmation for the warrant.262 Problematically, the
investigator’s own warrant clerk had immediately requested such fax confirmation
and received confirmation of the computer error within “10 to 15 minutes.”263
Given that the warrant clerk, apparently as a matter of routine, sought to check the
accuracy of the computer record and the short time frame to confirm it, a cost
benefit analysis in Herring would favor the defendant.264 Differently put, had a
similar fact scenario of failed diligence been pled in the context of negligence
(rather than civil rights) it is probable that the defendant would have been found
liable.265 Consequently, the good faith exception is not consistent with utilitarian
reasonableness.
The good faith exception development is similarly inconsistent with a
pragmatic analysis. Such an analysis would have focused on the rational basis of
the police officer conducting a search.266 This rational basis inquiry is inconsistent
with Davis.267 Davis applied the good faith exception because police officers
followed applicable precedent “to the letter.”268 The Davis court considered this
conduct reasonable because an appellate court had “specifically authorize[d] a
particular police practice.”269 A police officer could claim a rational basis to act
beyond the letter of an appellate decision in order to engage in a practice that while
not specifically authorized would be considered similar to it by some police
officers. This cannot be the test: the police officers in Kyllo certainly would think
that their practice was reasonably within the scope of prior precedent.270 Their
thinking was later supported by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

contacted Anderson over a secure radio. This all unfolded in 10 to 15 minutes, but Herring had already
been arrested and found with the gun and drugs, just a few hundred yards from the sheriff's office.”).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 137.
261. Id.
262. Id.137-38.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 261, 289 (2003) (“[A]n officer's failure to follow procedures consistent with training is often
passed off as mere negligence, an insufficient basis for a civil rights claim.”).
266. See supra Part II.B.1.
267. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 2429 (emphasis in original).
270. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
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Circuit.271 The determination admitting the fruits of their search into evidence was
nevertheless reversed, no matter their honest and rationally based beliefs.272 Under
a pragmatic reasonableness paradigm, they would not have been.273
III. REASONABLENESS AND THE RESOLUTION OF HARD CASES
Part II has established that American jurisprudence has adopted diverse
paradigms of reasonableness to resolve key problems in different areas of law. It
focused on a predominant reasonableness paradigm within each area of law. Part
III will probe further why paradigms of reasonableness matter to legal development
within each area of law.
Legal development means that the law adopts a conclusion to a problem
distinct and apart from the one which the previously applicable legal rule, or
principle, would have required.274 When such a development occurs, Frederick
Schauer surmised “the judge would justify this conclusion by reference to general
principles that lurk in various corners of the legal system,” or “ground the new
principle in some already existing principle.”275 As this Part shows, the premise for
this kind of legal change is not an obscure principle from some “corner of the legal
system,” but a central change in the reasonableness paradigm.276
Part III.A will show that a hard case arises when the formalist, pragmatic and
utilitarian reasonableness paradigms require different solutions to the same legal
dispute.277 Using the classic Cardozo decision Wood v. Lucy Lady Duff Gordon,278
Part III.A will show the anatomy of such a case.279 Hard cases thus provide the
common law with the opportunity for legal development, whether welcome or
not.280
As discussed in Part II.B, this development occurs within the confines of the
multiple reasonableness paradigms. Using the example of a recent dispute between
an oil major and a Latin American national oil company, Part III.B discusses how
the utilitarian concept of efficient breach is bringing about a paradigm realignment
in contract law.281 The efficient breach example shows how hard cases lead to
271. Id.
272. Id. at 40-41.
273. See Part II.A.1.
274. See Schauer Formalism, supra note 172, at 519; Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 74.
275. Schauer Formalism, supra note 172, at 518-19.
276. Id.
277. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 25 (1960)
[hereinafter Llewellyn Appeals] (defining hard cases as those involving the “inquiry into which of the
known permissible possibilities seem the probable best, and why.”).
278. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
279. See infra Part III.A.
280. Compare Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 415-16 (1985) [hereinafter
Schauer Easy Cases] (“Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there may be only one relevant rule, it
may be quite straightforwardly applicable, and its application would be consistent with its purpose. Yet
it may still be morally, socially, or politically hard, however, in the sense of hard to swallow.”), with
Northern Securities Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes J., dissenting) (“Great cases, like
hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in
shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which
appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment.”).
281. See generally Case No. 15416/JRF/CA, Award, (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. Dec. 23, 2011).
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legal development. In Karl Llewellyn’s terms, in these instances, “‘principle’ is
consulted to check up on precedent.”282 This check up is possible not because of a
“grand style” or prudent practice of the judging, as Professor Llewellyn supposed,
but is necessitated by the diversity of reasonableness paradigms in the common
law.283 It is this availability of multiple paradigms of reasonableness within the
common law which permits practicing lawyers and judges to probe precedent for
principle in the first place.284
As discussed in Part II.C, the failure to understand and properly to account for
the multiple paradigms of reasonableness can lead to significant confusion and
error. Using the recent Supreme Court decision Fisher v. University of Texas on
affirmative action, Part III.C will show that Fisher’s facial rejection of the good
faith standard to determine the constitutionality of admissions programs, literally
construed, leads to self-contradiction.285 Instead, Part III.C will explain that Fisher
intended to reject a definition of good faith according to the pragmatic
reasonableness paradigm and adopted a constructivist reasonableness paradigm in
its stead. It is this paradigm shift which makes the decision intelligible and can
give guidance to courts in the future to determine the constitutionality of other
admissions programs.
A. What’s a Hard Case? Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon
Scholarship typically treats the first case, Wood v. Lucy Lady Duff Gordon, as
a “great” case rather than a “hard” case.286 In fact, it displays none of the
characteristics typically associated with a hard case: there was a “formal” rule
which could have been straightforwardly applied (but was not),287 there was no
linguistic ambiguity in the applicable rule itself or indeterminacy in applying that
rule to facts,288 and one would feel no moral outrage irrespective who won the case
as both parties are equally unsympathetic.289 Despite all this, the case is not treated
282. Llewellyn Appeals, supra note 277, at 36 (“The type-thinking of the time is to view precedent as
welcome and very persuasive, but it is to test a precedent almost always against three types of reason
before it is accepted. The reputation of the opinion-writing judge counts heavily (and it is right reason
to listen carefully to the wise). Secondly, ‘principle’ is consulted to check up on precedent, and this
period and in this way of work ‘principle’ means no mere verbal tool for bringing large-scale order into
the rules, it means broad generalizations which must yield patent sense as well as order if it is to be
‘principle.’ Finally, ‘policy,’ in terms of prospective consequences of the rule under consideration
comes in for explicit examination by reason in a further test of both the rule and its application.”).
283. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons
About how Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 398 (1950) [hereinafter Llewellyn
Theory].
284. See Llewellyn Appeals, supra note 277, at 36.
285. See infra Part III.C.
286. As of December 17, 2007, the “case has been cited 1,219 times,” making it “one of the most
enduring and influential cases in the contracts pantheon.” James J. Fishman, The Enduring Legacy of
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 28 PACE L. REV. 162, 162&n.2 (2008) [hereinafter Fishman].
287. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917); cf. Dworkin Hard
Cases, supra note 35, at 1060 (adopting no settled-rule definition for hard cases); Schauer Easy Cases,
supra note 280, at 415.
288. See Wood, 118 N.E. at 214; cf. Schauer Easy Cases, supra note 280, at 415.
289. See Wood, 118 N.E. at 214; cf. Schauer Easy Cases, supra note 280, at 415-16; Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes J., dissenting).
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as a gross lapse in judgment and affront to stare decisis by an otherwise brilliant
jurist.290 In other words, the case must be a hard case, in which the ultimate
outcome must genuinely have been in doubt.291 It thus reveals something new
about hard cases: they arise not because of any of the typical symptoms of a hard
case, but have a different cause altogether, namely the clash of reasonableness
paradigms.292
The facts of Wood appear straightforward. A socialite and self-styled “creator
of fashions” Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon (think perhaps of a forerunner to Paris
Hilton) enters into a contract with an advertisement agency for “the exclusive right,
subject always to her approval, to place her indorsements on the designs of
others.”293 For the grant of the exclusive right, “she was to have one-half of ‘all
profits and revenues’ derived from any contracts [her agent] might make.”294 The
socialite, apparently cash-starved, broke the contract by placing her endorsement
on fashion without the agent’s knowledge and withheld profits.295 Famously, the
case notes that “[i]t is true that [the agent] does not promise in so many words that
he will use reasonable efforts to place the defendant’s indorsements and market her
designs,” but concludes that “such a promise is fairly to be implied.”296
What makes the facts anything other than straightforward for a judge is that
each paradigmatic conception of reasonableness requires a different result. Classic
formalism, from which Wood famously departed, would have deemed there to be
no contract and would have sided with Lady Lucy.297 Pragmatic reasonableness
reached the diametrically opposite result by implying a best efforts clause of which
the agent did not run afoul.298 Utilitarianism similarly would have found a contract
by implying a duty of good faith, but in any event would have found Wood
insufficiently diligent and thus in breach.299
1. The Classical Formalist Solution
Wood departs from a classical formalist solution, which would have resolved
the case in favor of Lady Lucy because Wood’s promise would have been deemed
illusory.300 That is to say, Wood’s agreement with Lady Lucy did not require

290. See citations supra note 277.
291. See Frederick Liu, Comment, The Supreme Court Appointments Process and the Real Divide
Between Liberals and Conservatives, 117 YALE L.J. 1947 (2008) (adopting genuine doubt definition).
292. Llewellyn Appeals, supra note 277, at 25. Compare Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Metaphors, Models,
and Meaning in Contract, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 987, 1035 (2012) (“We frame differently, and thus two
of us can look at the same facts and apply differing framing metaphors, long before we ever get to the
point of propositional analysis. That is what makes a hard case hard.”) (footnote omitted), with Karl N.
Llewellyn, A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 173, 186-8 (2005) (framing
Wood in different metaphors).
293. Wood, 118 N.E. at 214.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
298. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
299. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
300. Wood, 118 N.E. at 214.
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Wood to do anything or forbear to do anything at all.301 Because the agreement did
not require anything of Wood, it did not impose detriment on him. A “detriment to
the promise is a universal test for the sufficiency of consideration.”302 There was
no consideration given for Lady Lucy’s grant of an exclusive right and no contract
would have been formed.303
Classical formalism, like its constructivist cousin, rests upon a legal first
principle from which the rest of the law can be derived. The first principle of
classical formalism is individual autonomy.304 This individual autonomy required
a different rule of reasonableness than constructivism, namely one that maximally
empowered parties to a contract to structure their bargain without judicial
interference.305 The reasonable solution therefore was the one that most literally
enforced what the parties objectively agreed to by the plain terms of their
undertaking.306 In the case at bar, this was to find that there was no contract.
Given the role of Wood as a professional agent to a lay person, this result
would hardly seem unfair.307 In fact, it is highly likely that Wood omitted a best
efforts clause from the contract on purpose to achieve his own commercial ends.308
The brunt of legal form would have accrued to the detriment of the person best
positioned to account for and to prevent it. Adding that Wood hardly was very
diligent in finding marketing opportunities for Lady Lucy, it also would not leave
an undeserving defendant unjustly enriched.309 Whatever the reason to abandon the
classical formalist paradigm of reasonableness as autonomy, it was not casuistic
justice and its “immediate interests exercis[ing] a kind of hydraulic pressure.”310
301. Id.
302. CHRISTOPHER C LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 82 (Boston, Little,
Brown, and Company 1880).
303. Id.
304. Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1223, 1234 (1999).
305. Id.; see also Summers Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 20, at 865-66; Kennedy, supra
note 176, at 1746-49.
306. See sources cited supra note 305.
307. Wood, 118 N.E. at 214.
308. Gerald Caplan, Legal Autopsies: Assessing the Performance of Judges and Lawyers Through
the Window of Leading Contract Cases, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1, 40-1 (2009) (“What Cardozo didn't know,
and what generations of contracts professors did not know before Professor Victor Goldberg published
his research, is that Wood knew well how to draft a best efforts clause, having done so in other
contracts. His omission of a best efforts clause in the contract that he drafted was likely deliberate and
not the innocent oversight that Cardozo attributed to him.”) (footnote omitted).
309. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
310. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes J., dissenting). Although
constructivist formalism was not available to Justice Cardozo, it would not have removed the formalist
disagreement with pragmatism and utilitarianism. A constructivist formalist would agree that a duty of
good faith would have to be implied in the circumstances. See Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights:
Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 417-18(1992)(explaining
importance of good faith exercise of discretion for the integrity of the legal system governed by the
constructivist paradigm). But the scope of the implied duty of good faith would favor Lady Lucy over
Wood as Wood was highly inefficient in exploiting available commercial opportunities and thus himself
a bad faith actor. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. Other than the pragmatic and utilitarian paradigms,
constructivist reasonableness likely would have required the parties to continue performing their
contract, be it at different terms to reflect changed conditions because of the principled premium placed
on cooperation. See discussion in Part IV.B.3.; see also James Gordley, Impossibility and Changed and
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2. The Pragmatic Solution
The pragmatic solution to the Wood dispute is familiar. Justice Cardozo
immediately announces that the agreement can be saved by implying a promise of
reasonable best efforts on the part of Wood.311 This implied promise forms part of
Consistent with pragmatic
a duty of reciprocal, objective good faith.312
reasonableness, the reason to imply such a duty is to protect the effectiveness of the
parties’ bargain.313 In Professor Burton’s terms, Lady Lucy clearly tried to
recapture the foregone opportunity to market her endorsements herself and thus
acted in bad faith.314 In Professor Summers’ terms, Lady Lucy manifestly evaded
the spirit of the bargain.315 Premised upon this analysis of the contract, there is a
total breach on the part of Lady Lucy, given her own failure to act in good faith,
entitling Wood to the damages he claimed.316
Omitted from the discussion in Wood, but equally as important as the
implication of the duty of good faith, is the question what efforts, precisely, must
Wood undertake to act reasonably under the newly constituted contract? The
question is important because the facts show that Wood failed to take advantage of
readily available profitable opportunities to sell Lady Lucy’s endorsements.317
Troublingly, the opportunities must have been profitable and economical for Wood
to discover, or else Wood could not have sued for damages. It must be implied in
the decision that Wood’s efforts were reasonable despite the existence of additional
commercial opportunities he failed to exploit.
The reason that such an implication is fair is that Wood only needed to show a
rational basis for his efforts. To do so, he would have needed to offer only one
person who would testify that he did not fall below minimum industry practice.318
As he did in fact create some opportunities,319 he is likely to have found such a
Unforeseen Circumstances, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 513, 524-25 (2004) (discussing equilibrium adjustment
in the context of the UNIDROIT principles); see generally Keith A. Rowley, A Brief History of
Anticipatory Repudiation in American Contract Law, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 565, 629-637 (2001)
(discussing preference for continued cooperation in non-common law jurisdictions).
311. Wood, 118 N.E. at 214.
312. See David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U.
CHI. L. REV. 395, 429 n.110 (2013) (“[T]here are of course strands of good faith doctrine written into
the negotiation process. For example, courts will routinely ‘fix’ illusory contracts by implying some
reasonable set of reciprocal obligations into the parties’ terms”) (citations omitted); see also Lipshaw,
supra note 292, at 1020 (“From the facts recited in the opinion, we know nothing about the before-thefact subjective understandings of Lady Duff-Gordon, the ‘creator of fashions,’ or Wood, who was to sell
her valuable endorsements to manufacturers of dresses, millinery, and like articles.”).
313. Wood, 118 N.E. at 214-5 (“Without an implied promise, the transaction cannot have such
business ‘efficacy, as both parties must have intended that at all events it should have.’”); see also
discussion supra II.B.1.
314. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
315. See id.
316. Wood never claimed for specific performance of the contract and instead treated it as a case of
total breach: the Wood majority apparently agreed. Wood, 118 N.E. at 214.
317. See id. (“The plaintiff says that he kept the contract on his part, and that the defendant broke it.
She placed her indorsement on fabrics, dresses, and millinery without his knowledge, and withheld the
profits. He sues her for the damages . . . .”)
318. See supra Part II.B.2.
319. Wood, 118 N.E. at 214.
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person. It does not matter to this inquiry whether in this specific instance more
effort on the part of the promoter could have uncovered more lucrative
opportunities. This cost-benefit analysis is not immediately within the scope of
good faith.
Finally, the pragmatic reasonableness paradigm was not invented by Justice
Cardozo for purposes of the Wood decision. Pragmatist legal theory was already
well represented for example in the publication of Oliver Wendell Holmes predating the Wood decision by decades.320 In fact, the common law of contracts
changed in scope to meet commercial needs and practice and thus displayed a
deeply pragmatic modality almost from its very inception.321 The use of pragmatic
reasonableness to fashion an implied duty of good faith under the circumstances
was not original in the sense of being invented out of whole cloth—it was a clever
and careful adaptation of an existing paradigm of pragmatic reasonableness to new
facts.322
3. The Utilitarian Solution
Utilitarian reasonableness likely would imply a duty of good faith and thus
give effect to the agreement in Wood.323 But the scope of the duty of good faith
would differ in an outcome determinative manner for the case: Lady Lucy can keep
the profits of her own marketing efforts and potentially receives additional
damages from Wood for his breach of the implied duty of good faith. The
utilitarian reasonableness paradigm was recognized in nineteenth century
jurisprudence and thus would have been available to Justice Cardozo.324
Wood seeks damages rather than an injunction.325 For Wood to seek damages
from Lady Lucy, he would have to prove that it would have been economical for
him to find the same opportunities, i.e., that cost of the plaintiff’s own performance
would have been less than the sum secured by Lady Lucy.326 The opportunities
were in fact significant—one involving clothing for Sears, another an
advertisement for a motor company.327 This fact in its own right is problematic for

320. See Summers Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 20, at 872.
321. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 11-19 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the early
development of the enforcement of promises at common law); ANTONIO GAMBARO & RODOLFO SACCO,
SISTEMI GIURIDICI COMPARATI 132-33, 256 (2d ed., 2002).
322. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1379, 1397-99 (1995); Larry A. DiMatteo, Cardozo, Anti-Formalism, and the Fiction of
Noninterventionism, 28 PACE L. REV. 315 (2008).
323. See generally Sidgwick, supra note 35, at 17, 302-04.
324. Cf., James F. Moseley, General Overview of the Nature and Origin of Damages, Including a
General Historical and Philosophical Review of Damages under the Tort System, 72 TUL. L. REV. 383,
410-11 (1997).
325. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917). In fact, Wood is unlikely to
receive an injunction under a utilitarian reasonableness paradigm. See discussion infra III.B.
326. Leaving aside incidental and consequential damages, he would have to prove that the loss in
value to him by Lady Lucy’s failure to perform exceeded the cost avoided by not having to perform.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 347 (1981); see also id. § 347 cmt. e (“The injured party is
limited to damages based on his actual loss caused by the breach.”);RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONTRACTS
§ 329 cmt. b (1932) (same rule).
327. Fishman, supra note 286, at 162-63.
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Wood: it tends to show that he profitably could have been more diligent in
marketing Lady Lucy’s brand than he actually was.328 He should have found those
opportunities for the purely selfish reason to make more money himself. In other
words, it shows that Wood’s own performance of the contract was inefficient.329
Applying a utilitarian calculus to the transaction therefore reveals that Wood would
have breached his obligation of reasonable efforts first thus entitling Lady Lucy to
act to mitigate her own damages caused by Wood’s failure to perform his bargain
in good faith.330
Utilitarian reasonableness thus reaches a result that is even more in favor of
Lady Lucy than classic formalism. She loses the legal argument that there was no
contract. This legal loss inures to her financial benefit: not only does she get to
keep the money she has made from finding her own marketing opportunities as
mitigation of damages for Wood’s breach, it is possible that her agent owes her
more money for want of good faith. In any event, it is likely that the court would
side with her that there was total breach by Wood on account of his bad faith.331
4. Re-Defining Hard Cases
Examination of available reasonableness paradigms reveals the problem faced
by Justice Cardozo when writing Wood. There was no true disagreement that as a
matter of mechanical application of precedent, the rule premised upon the formalist
paradigm had the best pedigree—the decision in fact concedes as much.332 Instead,
the disagreement was whether the apparently most locally applicable legal rule was
still “reasonable.” Problematically, the available reasonableness paradigms
disagreed as to the appropriate outcome for the case, creating genuine ambiguity on
this point. No undue “hydraulic pressure” of a disproportionately sympathetic
party simplified the choice between them.333 The case thus was truly hard to
decide.
The case more importantly demonstrates that other definitions of hard cases
ultimately can be reduced to the same problem. Hard cases typically cite the
absence of a directly applicable rule or a linguistic ambiguity in its potential
application as a symptom of a hard case.334 This symptom upon closer analysis is
not helpful, as most any fact situation will be “new” in some way and thus run into
one of these problems. In most instances, it is simply that this potential gap or
ambiguity is irrelevant as existing law consistently can be extended to new facts no
matter which reasonableness paradigm is applied. A hard case does not reveal that
there is no rule that is perfectly applicable to the problem—this is true for almost
any case.335 It reveals that there is an indeterminacy in the legal decisionmaking
process itself because multiple results are legally conceivable or would appear
328. Cf. Megan Richardson & David Tan, Wood v. Duff Gordon and the Modernist Cult of
Personality, 28 PACE L. REV. 379, 382 (2008).
329. See generally supra Part II.A.I.
330. See generally supra Part II.A.I.
331. See generally Caplan, supra note 308, at 40-41; Richardson & Tan, supra note 328, at 383.
332. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917).
333. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes J., dissenting).
334. Schauer Easy Cases, supra note 280, at 415; Cf. Dworkin Hard Cases, supra note 35, at 1060.
335. Llewellyn Appeals, supra note 277, at 24-25.
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reasonable to a well-trained lawyer.336
It is also in this sense that hard cases arise when results are “hard to
swallow.”337 When the result is compared to different reasonableness paradigms, it
becomes clear that the decision is either out of synch with the basic values of the
legal system (and thus inconsistent with formalism), out of touch with actual
practice and moral common sense (and thus inconsistent with pragmatism), or
imposes a cost-prohibitive burden on society compared to other possible solutions
(and thus inconsistent with utilitarianism). The decision again is difficult because
any resolution of the problem is unreasonable in a different way.
The discussion so far has led to a different, simpler, and thus better definition
of hard cases and what happens when they are resolved. It also demonstrates that
what resolves a hard case “incorrectly” is to choose a result that is ultimately
inconsistent with any of the reasonableness paradigms available to the lawyer.338
Such a decision would cause “even well settled principles of law [to] bend.”339
But, as Wood has shown, hard cases do not have to do so.340 In fact, most hard
cases do not do so and simply pass unnoticed precisely because they remain
consistent with one or two reasonableness paradigms already inherent within the
law.341
B. How Does Law Develop? The Theory of Efficient Breach
The second hard case showcases that the law develops harmoniously when rule
application is questioned within the scope of the pragmatic, utilitarian, and
formalist paradigms in the context of efficient breach. The case is adapted from the
arbitration between Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd. v. Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A..342 It
provides a good example of how utilitarian reasonableness would come to the
conclusion that there should be an efficient breach when pragmatic and formalist
reasonableness would strongly disagree.343
The facts of the arbitration, as modified, again appear straightforward.
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA*),344 the Venezuelan national oil company,
entered into a joint venture agreement with a subsidiary of Exxon Mobil, Mobil
Cerro Negro (MCN*) in October 1997, known as the “Association Agreement.”345
The Association Agreement was concluded at a time of significantly lower oil
336. See id.
337. Schauer Easy Cases, supra note 280, at 415.
338. See Llewellyn Appeals, supra note 277, at 23-26.
339. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes J., dissenting).
340. See supra Part III.A.2.
341. See Schauer Formalism, supra note 172, at 518-19 (noting that the choice of an escape route to
avoid a formal rule would not seem odd to the common lawyer in the right circumstances).
342. See generally Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd. v. Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.
2011). The agreement was governed by the law of Venezuela. Id. at 62 (providing a fact scenario that,
with slight modifications, is an excellent example for the theory of efficient breach in the common law
of contracts, and how it differs from the dominant pragmatic approach discussed in Part II).
343. See infra Part II.
344. Because of the modifications to the fact scenario to better illustrate the differences between the
efficient breach and the traditional contract law approach, the names of the companies involved have
been marked with an asterisk.
345. Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd., S.A. at 29.
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prices.346 After a change in government in Venezuela, and a significant increase in
oil prices, PDVSA* sought to renegotiate the terms of the joint venture agreements
with MCN* and other agreements like it, threatening to expropriate all venture
partners who resisted the terms offered.347 MCN* did not agree to a renegotiation;
its assets were in fact expropriated and arbitration commenced.348 The crude oil to
be produced from the oil fields in question has a unique makeup to which the
majority of U.S. refining capacity is calibrated.349 The ostensible reason for the
expropriation was for PDVSA* to take for itself a larger share of the profits of the
joint venture generated by larger oil prices.350 For purposes of this hard case, let us
assume that the new partner would be able to produce more crude oil from the
wells in question.
The facts of the case again reveal a deeper legal tension. They show that the
theory of efficient breach is a legitimate answer to the hard case precisely because
it stays within the confines of existing reasonableness paradigms and in fact
actively claims historical pedigree to receive recognition.351 It is thus beside the
point to argue that efficient breach is not a legitimate resolution to a contract law
problem because it does not adhere to the pragmatic reasonableness paradigm.352
Resolving this deeper legal challenge to the pragmatic paradigm requires
something else entirely: a realignment of the pragmatic and formalist
reasonableness paradigms to address and justify the inefficiency revealed by the
efficient breach hypothesis or an adoption of the utilitarian paradigm if no such
justification is possible.353
1. Probing Pragmatic Reasonableness
Pragmatic reasonableness supports the traditional common law resolution to
the PDVSA* dispute. PDVSA*’s attempt to find another joint venture partner is a
classic example of seeking to recapture a foregone opportunity.354 It thus runs
afoul of pragmatic reasonableness and would be treated as a bad faith act.355 Under
the circumstances, a court would likely enjoin the attempt by PDVSA* to switch

346. Id. at 18-22.
347. Id. at 18-20.
348. Id. at 19.
349. See Emily A. Witten, Arbitration of Venezuelan Oil Contracts: A Losing Strategy?, 4 TEX. J.
OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 55, 79 (2008-2009). Cf. Jim Landers, Crumbling Venezuelan Oil Sector
Expected to Remain Hostile to U.S. Investment, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, (Mar. 6, 2013, 8:35 PM),
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/energy/20130306-crumbling-venezuelan-oil-sector-expected-toremain-hostile-to-u.s.-investment.ece; Thomas C. Hayes, Market Place; Southland’s Venezuela Deal,
N.Y. TIMES(Feb. 24, 1986)http://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/14/business/market-place-southland-svenezuela-deal.html (noting calibration of U.S. refining).
350. Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd., S.A. at 18–20.
351. See infra Part III.B.2
352. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REV.
559, 576 (2006) [hereinafter Eisenberg Disgorgement] (demonstrating that under the pragmatic
paradigm of reasonableness, recapturing the ability to locate an over-bidder over a price that was already
contractually agreed upon is using a termination provision in a contract in bad faith).
353. See infra Part III.B.2
354. See Burton, supra note 3, at 390-91.
355. See supra Part II.B.2
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joint venture partners.356 Its remedial premise for doing so is that MCN* would
suffer a harm that is not adequately compensable with money damages.357
Utilitarian reasonableness fundamentally departs from this premise. A classic
utilitarian excuse against keeping one’s word is that fulfillment is “more harmful to
oneself than beneficial” to one’s counterparty.358 A premise for this excuse is that
the respective harm and benefit of fulfillment as a matter of principle is measurable
in terms of money. This principle may be undercut as a matter of proof if there is
no ready market for the object of the contract.359 This question of valuation would
not arise in the context of the PDVSA*-MCN* transaction, as there is a list price
for the commodity in question (Venezuelan heavy crude), as well as reasonable
certainty as to the projected production volume for which compensation would be
due.360 These two factors permit a ready calculation of the buy-out value which
PDVSA* would have to pay to substitute a different joint venture partner. It
presumably would pay only if it would be significantly more efficient to do so.
Formalist-constructivist reasonableness takes a middle position between the
pragmatic and the utilitarian reasonableness paradigm in this kind of a fact
pattern.361 Breach under the circumstances is inconsistent with a duty of full and
reciprocal cooperation.362 It is even more so as it is propagated by coercive
means.363 At the same time, formalist-constructivist reasonableness would not
permit MCN* to keep unanticipated windfall profits.364 Its exclusivity would
permit it to take advantage of PDVSA*’s resources at a price that would have been
negotiated differently had current market conditions been anticipated.365
Consequently, a court would order the contract to be performed, but restore the
economic balance at the outset of the agreement by adapting the pricing formula to

356. See Eisenberg Disgorgement, supra note 352, at 576-77 (discussing good faith in the U.S. law
of contracts).
357. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 359 cmt. a, 360(c), 364(2) (1981) (discussing
injunctions and adequacy of damages in the common law of contracts).
358. Sidgwick, supra note 35, at 17.
359. Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 1992). See also
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the
Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1001 (2005) [hereinafter Eisenberg
Efficient Breach] (discussing the decision in Walgreen).
360. It is of course true that the value of oil fluctuates. Using the appropriate list price is nevertheless
the appropriate value because the breaching party is exercising an option to buy out its partner at current
value and assumes the risk of downward fluctuations. The breaching party was not forced to buy out its
partner, i.e., it cannot honestly complain that the price does not reflect the value of the commodity. The
non-breaching party may legitimately believe that the value of the commodity would increase further
and could submit valuations to that effect. Absent convincing proof however, the market price would be
just that—the fair value of the commodity that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller at the time of
the transaction in question.
361. See Maud Piers, Good Faith in English Law – Could a Rule Become a Principle?, 26 TUL. EUR.
& CIV. L.F. 123, 131 (2011) (discussing how “the idea of cooperativism . . . is said to undergird the
general notion of good faith in European (continental) contract law”).
362. See supra Part II.C.1; see also Rowley, supra note 310, at 629-37.
363. See supra Part II.C.1
364. Cf. Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law [UNIDROIT], Principles of Int’l Commercial
Contracts, art. 6.2.2 (2004).
365. See, e.g., Gordley, supra note 310, at 524-25.
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the new market circumstances through equilibrium adjustment.366
PDVSA* is another instance in which there appears to be a basic inconsistency
between the common law’s core reasonableness paradigms. All three paradigms
reach fundamentally inconsistent results. Again the choice of the appropriate
paradigm is not likely to be moved significantly by an irresistible swell of
sympathy for any of the litigating parties. In short, it is a situation of legal
equipoise much in the same way as Wood was.
2. The Source of the Efficient Breach Logic
The theory of efficient breach addresses this clash of reasonableness
paradigms. Its proponents argue that “if the promisor’s gain from breach, after
payment of expectation damages, will exceed the promisee’s loss from breach,”
breach of contract is desirable.367 Proponents of the efficient breach do not simply
state a policy preference, but instead argue for the adoption of utilitarian
reasonableness from the realm of torts to govern part of the law of contract, as
well.368 Their point is thus not to criticize the law from the outside, but to change it
from the inside. It is a legitimate(d) argument within the common law.
Proponents of efficient breach also give historical reasons for favoring
efficient breach over its pragmatic competitor. Richard Posner, the leading
proponent of efficient breaches, in a recent article expressly relies upon Oliver
Wendell Holmes’ theory of contract law to formulate his own theory of good faith
in contract law.369 Drawing on Holmes’ view that contract law provided a faultless
regime of liability, Judge Posner submits that good faith, consistent with efficient
breach theory, “is just a duty to avoid exploiting the temporary monopoly position
that a contracting party will sometimes obtain during the course of performance”
created by the fact that “one party may unavoidably deliver himself into the power
of the other party for a time during the performance of the contract.”370 This
historical reasoning again underscores that efficient breach in fact stands for
continuity in the law as a whole—rather than changing it—despite the radically
different results reached by it in hard cases.
Opponents of efficient breach frequently argue that efficient breach is
inconsistent with the predominant, pragmatic reasonableness paradigm of the
common law of contracts.371 This criticism of efficient breach meets Judge
Posner’s attempts to provide a pragmatic proof for the principle of efficient

366. See Gordley, supra note 310, at 524-25.
367. Eisenberg Efficient Breach, supra note 359, at 997. See also Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never
Blame a Contract Breaker, 107MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1350 (2009) [hereinafter Posner Contract Breaker].
368. See, e.g., Marco Jimenez, Finding the Good in Holmes’s Bad Man, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2069,
2092 (2011).
369. See Posner Contract Breaker, supra note 367, at 1350.
370. Id. at 1358.
371. See, e.g., Eisenberg Disgorgement, supra note 355, at 576 (arguing from pragmatic
reasonableness); see also Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the ‘Restitution Interest,’ and the
Restatement of Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021, 2044-53 (2001) (arguing from both pragmatic
reasonableness and policy); Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwarz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New
Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939, 1944-45 (2011) (arguing as a matter of
policy).
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breach.372 This line of argument does not address the underlying problem that the
theory of efficient breach reveals: in the factual circumstances to which efficient
breach applies, there is a clash of the pragmatic, utilitarian, and formalist
reasonableness paradigms.373
Remarkably, opponents of efficient breach have also responded in a different
way to the challenge: they re-examine the “principle” or paradigm requiring the
rejection of efficient breach.374 This re-examination may yet reveal that
community standards have shifted sufficiently to warrant changing the rules of
remedies within the pragmatic reasonableness paradigm—i.e., it may no longer be
true that an efficient breach would be considered an attempt to recapture foregone
opportunities within the relevant community.375 Additionally, it may be necessary
to defend the inefficiency of the community standards upon the basis of legal value,
as some authors have done.376 The rule would no longer be defended because it
reflects community standards;377 common practice would be defended as reflecting
a deeper political value in its own right and thus subsumed within the constructivist
framework.378 If either route fails, the logical conclusion is that the cost imposed
by the current rule is too high. In this case, the utilitarian paradigm would prevail
and govern this particular area of the common law of contracts.
Put differently, legal development occurs not because of outside policy
pressures but because the different paradigms of reasonableness create a stress field
within the common law. Hard cases make this stress field visible. When a critical
mass of similar hard cases arises and continuously probes the inconsistency
between different reasonableness paradigms, these hard cases can eventually force
a paradigm shift.379 Alternatively, the hard cases can cause a change within either
the pragmatic or constructivist paradigms better to reflect actual community
standards or the fundamental value upon which the legal system is formally
based.380 In this sense, Karl Llewellyn’s ‘grand style’ correctly predicted the
symptoms of change in the common law as the need to check up on precedent by
reference to principle.381 But different from what he had surmised, this return to
principle is brought about by an entirely internal structural element of the common
law rather than an external force acting upon it.382

372. See Posner Contract Breaker, supra note 367, at 1352.
373. See supra Part III.B.1.
374. See Kull, supra note 371, at 2044-53 (critiquing efficient breach); Markovits & Schwartz, supra
note 371, at 1944-45 (same); Eisenberg Efficient Breach, supra note359, passim (same); cf. Llewellyn
Appeals, supra note 277, at 36.
375. See supra Part II.B.2.
376. See supra citations in note 374.
377. See supra Part II.B.2.
378. See supra Part II.B.2.
379. For the concept of critical mass, see generally Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in
Legal Discourse, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 97 (2007); see also Llewellyn Appeals, supra note 277, at 25.
380. Because of its focus on efficiency, the utilitarian paradigm is unique in its constancy and acts as
a check on the other two. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.1, and II.C.1.
381. Llewellyn Appeals, supra note 277, at 36.
382. Llewellyn Theory, supra note 283, at 396 (“’Precedent’ guided, but ‘principle’ controlled; and
nothing was good ‘Principle’ which did not look like wisdom-in-result for the welfare of All-of-us.”).
For a detailed discussion of this process, see discussion in Part 0.
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C. The Reasonableness Problem in Fisher v. University of Texas
The final hard case showcases the significant danger of misunderstanding this
relationship between reasonableness paradigms: Fisher v. University of Texas.383
The Court’s majority opinion facially rejects “good faith” as the appropriate
standard for determining whether or not a state university’s admission policy
considering race violates the Equal Protection Clause.384 This holding is both
confusing and confused. As discussed in this Part, the Fisher majority only
rejected a good faith standard premised upon pragmatic reasonableness.385 The
Fisher majority in fact adopted a good faith standard premised upon the
constructive reasonableness paradigm.386 A mechanical application of the decision
therefore is ultimately unworkable. The decision only makes sense if, rather than
rejecting “reasonableness” as a relevant factor, it changed the meaning of what is
“reasonable” in the context of an Equal Protection analysis.
1. How to Solve a Problem Like Ms. Fisher
Ms. Fisher, a Caucasian Texas resident, unsuccessfully applied for admission
to the University of Texas and thereupon sued.387 The University of Texas admits
Texas residents automatically if they are in the top ten percent of their high school
class.388 Automatic admission accounts for the assignment of more than eighty
percent of available places for Texas residents.389 The admission decision for the
remaining applicants relies upon a graph drawn on the basis of an Academic Index
(AI), compiling GPA, test scores etc., on one axis and a Personal Achievement
Index (PAI), set on the other axis, which “measures a student’s leadership and
work experience, awards, extracurricular activities, community service, and other
special circumstances . . . .”390 Following the Supreme Court decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger, the PAI took race into account but did not assign race an independent
numerical value.391
The Supreme Court granted certiorari upon confirmation of a summary
judgment for the university by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.392 The Court recounted that the appellate decision affirming the summary
judgment held that the “petitioner could challenge only ‘whether [the University’s]
decision to reintroduce race as a factor in admissions was made in good faith.’”393
It noted that “in considering such a challenge, the [Fifth Circuit] would ‘presume
the University acted in good faith’ and place on petitioner the burden of rebutting
383. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
384. Id. at 2421.
385. See Cass Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 78(1996) [hereinafter
Sunstein Undecided] (“‘[R]ational basis’ review is rooted in a presumption of good faith, rebutted only
in rare instances.”); cf. definition of pragmatic reasonableness, supra Part II.B.1.
386. See supra Part III.C.2.
387. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417.
388. Id. at 2416.
389. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 229 (5th Cir. 2011).
390. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415.
391. Id. at 2416.
392. Id. at 2417.
393. Id. at 2420.
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that presumption.”394 The Court highlighted that the Fifth Circuit had “attempt[ed]
only to ‘ensure that [the University’s] decision to adopt a race-conscious
admissions policy followed from [a process of] good faith consideration’”
concluding that “[b]ecause ‘the efforts of the [u]niversity have been studied,
serious, and of high purpose’ . . . the use of race in the admissions program fell
within ‘a constitutionally protected zone of discretion.’”395
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in favor of the University of Texas
and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision.396 The
Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s good faith analysis because “the mere recitation
of a ‘benign’ or legitimate purpose for a racial classification is entitled to little or
no weight.”397 Rather, “[s]trict scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a school’s
assertion that its admissions process uses race in a permissible way without a court
giving close analysis to the evidence of how the process works in practice.”398 The
Court concluded that “[t]he District Court and Court of Appeals confined the strict
scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to the University’s good faith in
its use of racial classifications and affirming the grant of summary judgment on
that basis.”399
The Court explained that instead, “it remains at all times the University’s
obligation to demonstrate, and the Judiciary’s obligation to determine, that
admissions processes ‘ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and
not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his
or her application,’” and that the “reviewing court verify that it is ‘necessary’ for a
university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.”400 This
standard requires that the “reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no
workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of
diversity.”401
2. Constructivist Reasonableness of Affirmative Action
Whatever its facial criticism of the Fifth Circuit decision, the Fisher Court
itself adopted a good faith test to determine whether an affirmative action program
is compatible with the Equal Protection Clause. This test balances an individual
right (non-discrimination in the Equal Protection context vs. privacy in the Fourth
Amendment context) against a compelling state interest (making available high
quality public education in the Equal Protection context vs. security in the Fourth
Amendment context). This balance is struck on the basis of constructivist
reasonableness.
The Court anchors its discussion of affirmative action in a fundamental
individual right. “‘Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry
are by their very nature odious to a free people,’ and therefore ‘are contrary to our
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2422.
Id. at 2421 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2420.
Id.
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traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.’”402 This fundamental individual
right is applied to the educational setting centrally by requiring that a university
applicant must be “evaluated as an individual.”403 To be evaluated as an individual,
the applicant cannot be treated as a means to the end of achieving racial diversity in
the university: “‘[t]hat would amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently
unconstitutional.’ ‘Racial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently
unconstitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial
diversity.””404 Instead, to treat an applicant “as an individual,” the university must
treat the applicant as an end in him or herself.405
This analysis follows the same logic as the critical paragraph in the exemplary
decision for constructive reasonableness, Kyllo.406 Kyllo anchors its discussion in a
criterion “with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of
privacy.”407 Fisher also anchors its discussion in a criterion rooted in the American
public’s traditions as a free people.408 It then applies this axiomatic principle to a
new situation: in Kyllo, the use of a new technology by law enforcement not yet
tested by the Supreme Court; in Fisher, the use of a yet untested state university
admissions program considering race as a factor.409
Like Kyllo, the Fisher majority further protects a compelling state interest. In
Kyllo, this interest was the use of police power consistent with original balance of
privacy and security in Year Zero.410 In Fisher, the interest is to make available to
state residents a high quality public education consistent with state educational
policy.411 Fisher quotes Grutter that “a university’s ‘educational judgment that [. .
.] diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.’”412 To
achieve this goal, a university does not need to exhaust “every conceivable raceneutral alternative,” but the university must have considered “workable race-neutral
alternatives,”413 which must come “at a tolerable administrative expense.”414
Further, “a court can take account of a university’s experience and expertise in
adopting or rejecting certain admissions processes,” even if such taking account is
by no means dispositive.415
402. Id. at 2418 (citations omitted).
403. Id.
404. Id. at 2419.
405. See id. at 2420.
406. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). See also discussion supra Part II.C.2.
407. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (2001); accord Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 498 (“On the basis of
this criterion, the information obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the product of a search.”).
408. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418-19.
409. Compare Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35 (discussing change in law enforcement technology), with
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (discussing new form of university admissions program considering race as a
factor).
410. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35 (discussing the original privacy/security balance struck by the
constitution); see also Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 497-98 (discussing balancing in light of a
hypothetical Year Zero position).
411. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (discussing educational judgment and racial diversity).
412. See id.
413. Id. at 2420 (citation omitted).
414. Id.
415. Id. (“True, a court can take account of a university’s experience and expertise in adopting or
rejecting certain admissions processes. But, as the Court said in Grutter, it remains at all times the
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The Fisher interest, like Kyllo, can be reformulated in terms of a hypothetical
original position in Year Zero.416 In this original position, people writing the
original social contract would have to decide upon the value of a public education
system in the abstract. In the specific context of the U.S. Constitution,
contemporaneous documents noted that “[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of education shall forever be encouraged.”417 The balance, thus is one of
allowing the state to provide the kind of education it deems conducive to good
government in a free society while at the same time protecting the individual rights
of those seeking admittance to state educational institutions.418 The Fisher Court
applied this balance to the admissions program at issue in a specific affirmative
action case.
Fisher results in a reasonable college admission program when the reviewing
court is ultimately “satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would
produce the educational benefits of diversity.”419 Under Fisher, courts apply the
constructivist criterion of reasonableness to balancing tests more generally.
Analytically, a court would evaluate an admissions program from the point of view
of an original position420 that assumes a scarcity of openings at the most desirable
university programs.421 Further, one does not know which race, socio-economic
background etc. he or she will be born into.422 Because of the scarcity of places at
the most desirable universities, it would not be possible to admit everyone—i.e.,
there will be rejected applicants.423 Thus, one has to choose the admissions
program that most benefits even the inevitably rejected applicant.424 The raceneutral alternative would thus have to be worse from the point of view of the
original position than the program adopted by the university.
The Fisher court thus applies its own constructivist good faith test. Treating
an applicant not as an individual but as a demographic specimen is not to deal with
him or her in good faith. This good faith test is applied not to the creation of the
admissions program, but is applied to the specific admissions decision to which it
leads.

University's obligation to demonstrate, and the Judiciary's obligation to determine, that admissions
processes ‘ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an
applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.’”) (citations omitted).
416. See Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 497-98 (discussing how Kyllo sets out a constructivist
balance by reference to a Year-Zero original position).
417. The Confederate Congress Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, Art. III
(1787) (current version at 1 U.S.C. at LV (2006)). See generally Matthew J. Festa, Property and
Republicanism in the Northwest Ordinance, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 409 (2013) (discussing the importance of
the ordinance); Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 92 (2013) (discussing the value of education in the constitutional setting).
418. See Kerr Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 497-98 (setting out a similar balancing analysis in the
context of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
419. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
420. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
421. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
422. See supra Part II.C.1.
423. See supra Part II.C.1.
424. See supra Part II.C.1.
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3. The Source of the Fisher Confusion
The Fisher decision is confusing because it appears to reject a good faith
standard established in Grutter425 without replacing it with a clear alternative
standard of its own. As the previous Part showed, this initial impression is
misleading on both counts. The decision does in fact rely upon a standard of good
faith that is consistent with the Grutter decision.426 It requires a constructivist good
faith analysis of the application decisions taken by a university.427 It moves away
from an analysis of the good faith in adopting the admissions program in question.
What makes Fisher confusing is its indiscriminate treatment of “good faith”
when it intends to reject only a certain kind of good faith. The good faith rejected
by Fisher concerns the assertion of reasons by the school as to why its program
complies with the requirements of equal protection.428 The appellate court used the
good faith analysis in order to determine whether the program fell within a
“constitutionally protected zone of discretion.”429 This type of good faith is
borrowed from the law of contracts, which deals similarly with the question of
whether a party exercised discretion in good faith in the context of best efforts
clauses, for example.430 The question, therefore, is whether other similarly situated
actors would understand the reasons proposed by the university to support its
program, i.e., whether the program had a rational basis.431 It is this type of good
faith that is the target of rebuke by the Supreme Court.
The failure to discriminate between different forms of good faith will very
likely lead to future misapplication of Fisher. Fisher’s rejection of a good faith
analysis will likely hide from view that the decision still engages in a good faith
balancing test. This balancing test still intends to take seriously both the resources
of the university and its educational goals.432 The problem of rejecting good faith
is that the legitimate interests of the university are likely not going to be
sufficiently considered in future decisions because of the confusing statement in
Fisher that “the [u]niversity receives no deference” with regard to the tailoring of
its admissions program to meet legitimate diversity goals.433 This overbroad
statement specifically hides from view that the university need only consider
“workable” solutions that impose “tolerable administrative expense”—with
“workable” and “tolerable” both introducing a deference standard that would be
precluded by the overbroad statement upon an initial reading of the decision.434
Greater precision in the treatment of good faith would avoid precisely this
425. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
426. See supra Part III.C.2.
427. See supra Part III.C.2.
428. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (“It must be remembered that ‘the
mere recitation of a benign or legitimate purpose for a racial classification is entitled to little or no
weight.’ Strict scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a school’s assertion that its admissions process
uses race in a permissible way without a court giving close analysis to the evidence of how the process
works in practice.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
429. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 231 (5th Cir. 2011).
430. See Miller & Perry Contracts, supra note 3, at 727.
431. Compare supra Part II.B.2, with Sunstein Undecided, supra note 385, at 78.
432. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
433. See id.
434. See id.
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problem. An understanding of the diversity of reasonableness paradigms, and thus
good faith, is a necessary condition for such greater precision. The Court’s
affirmative action jurisprudence, therefore, will improve only once it admits to the
necessary diversity of the law which it is tasked to apply.
IV. THE NECESSITY OF DIVERSITY
Parts I and II established the fact that the common law relies upon diverse
reasonableness paradigms. Part I set out that these paradigms are premised upon
fundamentally different theoretical starting points. Part II theorized that hard cases
arise when specific cases cause these paradigms to conflict with each other. It
explained how the paradigm clash in hard cases causes the law to develop. It
finally showcased that failure to understand the inherent diversity of reasonableness
in the common law can lead to significant confusion and misunderstanding. The
question remains whether the diversity of reasonableness paradigms is an accident
or a necessary feature of the common law. This Part submits that the diversity of
the common law is both necessary and desirable.
A. The Axiomatic Nature of Reasonableness
Diversity within the common law is narrowly “necessary” because
reasonableness is an axiomatic principle.435 Reasonableness is an axiomatic
principle in the logical sense. An axiom in logic is “an indemonstrable first
principle, rule, or maxim that has found general acceptance or is thought worthy of
common acceptance whether by virtue of a claim to intrinsic merit or on the basis
of an appeal to self-evidence.”436 Consequently, the legal command that people
ought to act “reasonably” cannot be reduced to some other principle.437 It relies
precisely on the intuitive appeal that it is self-evident that people ought to treat each
other reasonably.438
The diversity of reasonableness paradigms within the common law does not
permit one to “split the difference” between the various conceptions of
reasonableness and arrive at a single, overarching principle.439 A disagreement
between first principles cannot be bridged.440 Any attempt at reconciliation of the
common law along the lines of some higher order first principle, therefore, must
fail.
Further doctrinal refinement also would fail to reduce the common law to a
single overarching principle. Such refinement would be fruitful only if no coherent
conception of reasonableness had emerged.441 This is not the case—several

435. See, e.g., Finnis, supra note 27, at 930.
436. Axiom, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/46193/axiom
(last visited Aug. 1, 2013); see, e.g., John Stick, Can Nihilism be Pragmatic? 100 HARV. L. REV. 332,
346 (1986).
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. If this were not the case, reasonableness would not be “axiomatic.”
440. Cf. Rawls Justice, supra note 68, at 62-63.
441. See generally Kuhn, supra note 31, at 81, 96-105, 108 (discussing paradigm development in the
scientific context).
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coherent conceptions of reasonableness have emerged.442 These conceptions
require fundamentally inconsistent results in hard cases.443 Further doctrinal
research, therefore, will confirm rather than refute the necessary multiplicity of
reasonableness paradigms in the common law.444
The only way to overcome the diversity of reasonableness paradigms within
the common law is to choose one set of first principles and reject the others. Doing
so would require a significant change in current jurisprudence. Choice of a
pragmatist paradigm would upend, for example, tort law, constitutional criminal
procedure, and equal protection jurisprudence.445 Choice of a utilitarian conception
would also upend the common law of contracts and first amendment
jurisprudence.446 Choice of a constructivist prism would undercut the strong value
of responsiveness to community standards, which still underpins much of U.S.
commercial law.447
Such a choice could not be made “within” the law. There is no legal criterion
which would permit the choice of any one conception of reasonableness over the
others.448 The legal means to choose between outcomes in hard cases is precisely
by reference to a criterion of reasonableness.449 The multiplicity of reasonableness
paradigms renders such an attempt either circular or futile.450 The choice of a
single reasonableness paradigm thus is political and political only.
Consequently, formalism, including constructivism is not a tenable general
theory of law. The existence of multiple conceptions of reasonableness deprives
formalism of the fixed point within the law according to which one could engage in
the Herculean task of the consistent reorganization of the common law as a
whole.451 Formalism rejects that the choice of the first principle is a purely
political one in which the law would become complicit.452 As this is precisely what
is needed to overcome the diversity of reasonableness, formalism fails as a
universal theory of law.
B. The Function of Reasonableness in the Common Law
The reason that formalism ultimately fails also defeats pragmatism as a tenable
general theory of law. Formalism failed not because there was no first principle
from which the law could be logically reconstructed, as pragmatism would
submit;453 it failed because there were too many inconsistent first principles

442. See generally supra Part II
443. See supra Part III.A.
444. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.
445. See generally supra Part II
446. See generally supra Part II
447. See generally supra Part III.A.
448. See supra Part III.B.
449. See supra Part III.B.
450. See supra Part III.B.
451. See supra Part II.C.1.
452. See supra Part II.C.1.
453. Holmes Common Law, supra note 29, at 3, 36 (“[t]he law embodies the story of a nation’s
development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and
corollaries of a book of mathematics.”); see generally Holmes Path, supra note 29.
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embedded in the law.454 If this diversity itself is a structural quality of the common
law, then law is precisely the kind of self-sustaining and self-sufficient limited
domain pragmatists argue not to exist.455 That is to say that the pragmatic position
is incorrect “that the success of a use of law should be judged by its effects.”456 It
can and should be measured by reference to internal legal criteria.
As discussed in this Part, the structure of the common law shows that
pragmatic, constructivist, and utilitarian reasonableness are archetypical for the
common law rule-making process. This common law process is distinctively
inductive rather than deductive. The inductive generation of rules operates upon
the basis of an oscillation between the paradigmatic command of the formalist,
constructivist reasonableness paradigms. This oscillation is structurally necessary
rather than accidental.
1. The Grammar of Law
The common law, like any other legal system has structure. Pragmatists go
along with this basic premise in supposing that understanding what law is, really
means to predict what courts will do in the future.457 Such an undertaking
presupposes at least the assignment of adjudicative power to the courts (why else
fear them?).458 But, the determination of the successful legal argument is also
embedded in this structure (i.e., the one that will bring about the predicted
result).459
More basically, this structure must determine what constitutes permissible
legal argument.460 There are many statements that make sense as philosophical,
theoretical or political statements—a state will survive only if it is defended by a
constantly armed citizen army.461 These statements do not yet make legal sense
because they are not yet linked up to the legal structure.462 One can thus predict
with relative ease that they would not be understood by any court as a legal
argument addressing a legal problem.
The resulting structure of the law resembles the grammar of a language. A
grammar is commonly defined as “rules of a language governing [its] sounds,
words, sentences, and other elements, as well as their combination and
interpretation.”463 This grammar maps the scope of possible statements and

454. See supra Part IV.A.
455. See Schauer Domain, supra note 24, at 1927.
456. Summers Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 20, at 872.
457. See, e.g., Holmes Common Law, supra note 29, at 79 (discussing the predictive force of
precedent in tort law); Holmes Path, supra note 29, at 457-58; Llewellyn Appeals, supra note 277, at 26;
see also Summers Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 20, at 904-05.
458. See, e.g., Holmes Path, supra note 29, at 457.
459. See, e.g., Llewellyn Appeals, supra note 277, at 26.
460. See id. at 29-31.
461. See, e.g., NICCOLÓ MACHIAVELLI, THE WORKS NICCOLÓ MACHIAVELLI 756 (Golgotha Press,
2010) (“although I have already said on another occasion that a good militia is the foundation of all
States, and where that is wanting there can neither be good laws, nor aught else that is good.”).
462. See, e.g., Llewellyn Appeals, supra note 277, at 23-24.
463. Grammar, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/ topic/240915/grammar (last visited Aug. 1, 2013).
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permissible relationships between objects and concepts within a language.464 The
structure of law is a “grammar” because it similarly provides the rules of law
governing its basic elements, i.e., identification of legal propositions, as well as
their permissible combination and interpretation.465
The structure of law, like grammar, can be identified on the basis of markers.
Linguistically, these markers are morphemes identifying the grammatical function
of a word.466 For example, “am,” “will,” and “would” are grammatical markers
indicating the tense and mood of the word “to be.”467 On the basis of a study of
these markers one can theorize the structure of the language and write its
grammar.468 To theorize about law, one thus needs to find significant markers
identifying its fundamental structure.
Like a grammar, these structures are not permanent but transient and subject to
change.469 But unlike grammar, they are completely self-contained and exhaustive
of the entire conceptual world of that language at any given point in time.470 Like
grammar, each law has a structure that in a way is entirely unique to it.471 For
instance, a statement makes sense in French because it is consistent with French
grammar, not because it is consistent with Latin or Italian grammar. But like
grammar, structures have historical and analytical points of overlap that further the
development of the conceptual language through time.
2. The Conceptions of Reasonableness as Markers of the Common Law
The pragmatic, utilitarian and formalist reasonableness paradigms are common
law “markers” in this grammatical sense. They function like the “–s” ending of the
word “smoke” in the sentence “Raleigh smokes.”472 That ending identifies that
“smoke” is the action “to smoke” (not an object, “the smoke”) and identifies
Raleigh as the particular actor. The marker “-s” assigns “smoke” its place (and
meaning) in the English sentence “Raleigh smokes.”473
Reasonableness paradigms modify rules in the same way to make them
intelligible as a legal proposition. For instance, pragmatic reasonableness modifies
the rule “contracts must be performed” by adding the implicit “in good faith,” and
explicating what conduct a court would consider sufficient performance of a

464. See, e.g., LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, WERKAUSGABE BAND 1,253 (1997) [hereinafter
WITTGENSTEIN]; P. F. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS 140 (1959) [hereinafter STRAWSON].
465. I use the term “proposition” here to mean “assertion.” See Strawson, supra note 464, at 150.
See, e.g., Llewellyn Appeals, supra note 277 (discussing this understanding of law in pragmatic
thought).
466. See generally Mary Whisner, Alphabetical Order and Other “Simple” Systems, 96 LAW LIBR. J.
757 (2004).
467. Id.
468. WILLARD VAN ORMANQUINE, WORD & OBJECT 89 (Leo L. Beranek, Roman Jakobson, &
William N. Locke eds., 1960).
469. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 464, at 253.
470. Id. at 250.
471. See QUINE, supra note 468, at 73-79.
472. Cf. STRAWSON, supra note 464, at 143-166 (using the same example); WITTGENSTEIN, supra
note 464, at 241.
473. Strawson, supra note 459, at 139-179.
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contract (conduct for which there is a rational basis).474
More basically still, without reasonableness, the rule “contracts must be
performed” could not be placed in the appropriate context to understand its
meaning, just like “Raleigh smoke,” without the “-s” ending could refer to an
incorrectly formed sentence or a kind of fume found in North Carolina. This
quality means that the reasonableness paradigms are significant grammatical
markers because they determine the process of norm generation in the same way
that predicates determine the process of proposition generation.475
The reasonableness paradigms are not just grammatical but make up the “deep
grammar” of the common law.476 As discussed above, the reasonableness
paradigms are in an oppositional relationship.477 They present inconsistent first
This
principles according to which any legal statement makes sense.478
oppositional relationship creates a stress field within the common law that develops
whenever an actual dispute reveals an outcome determinative inconsistency
between the reasonableness paradigms.479 If a sufficient number of hard cases
arise, the stress field causes a realignment: it forces an examination of the relevant
paradigms to determine (a) whether the legal norm still actually conforms to
community standards (pragmatic paradigm), (b) whether the legal norm should be
modified to give effect to a fundamental right (formalist paradigm), or (c) whether
the legal norm is too costly or inefficient (utilitarian paradigm).480 This
examination, in turn, can lead to a switch of paradigms or to internal readjustment
of the paradigms to respond to the tension.481 No matter the choice, the law would
have changed in a substantive way but remained internally coherent in a
grammatical sense.
This grammar of the common law is precisely inconsistent with the pragmatic
argument that law is not a limited domain.482 The stress field created by the
oppositional forces of the reasonableness paradigms defines internally what the

474. See supra Part III.A.
475. See Wittgenstein, supra note 464, at 252 (to name something “could be called the preparation of
a word for use. But to what end is it a preparation?”) (Frédéric G. Sourgens trans.). Here, the
reasonableness paradigms precisely identify the end of the legal rule.
476. Id. at 478 (contrasting deep grammar as a structural element distinct from the superficial
grammar how words are used in syntax).
477. See supra Part II
478. Wittgenstein, supra note 464, at 256 (“Think someone points at a vase and says ‘look what
marvelous blue! Its shape does not matter.’ Or ‘look what a marvelous shape! The color is irrelevant.’
Without a doubt you will do different things when you follow each instruction.”) (Frédéric G. Sourgens
trans.).
479. See HERACLITUS, FRAGMENTS 32 (Brooks Haxton trans., 2001); NUSSBAUM, supra note 12, at
81 (“We are asked to see that a conflict-free life would be lacking in value and beauty next to a life in
which it is possible for conflict to arise; that part of the value of each claim derives from a special
separateness and distinctness that would be eclipsed by harmonization. That, as Heraclitus put it, justice
really is strife: that is, that the tensions permit this sort of strife to arise are also, at the same time, partly
constitutive of the values themselves. Without the possibility of strife it would all fall apart, be itself no
longer.”).
480. See supra Part III.B.
481. See supra Part III.B.
482. See supra citations in notes 453-456.
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common law can admit and what remains outside of its borders.483 It determines
the (limited) potential legal solutions to any hard case.484 It is this stress field that
defines the force of the law in the sense of its actuality and its potentiality—what it
currently is and what it can become.485 It precisely shows that law is indeed a
limited domain because it is analytically self-sustaining and self-sufficient.486 But,
the diversity of paradigms means that it is a kind of inductive, not a deductive
domain.
3. The Common Law as Inductive Normativity
The deep structure which generates this force is an inductive normativity. The
inductive structure of the common law is intuitive. Rather than being the result of
comprehensive legislation by legal scientists, the common law is a creature of case
law.487 This case law responds to specific fact patterns and legal arguments to
resolve these fact patterns. By addressing a sufficient number of fact patterns, it is
then possible to establish a rule which appears common to each problem’s solution.
This rule is then applied in future cases to fact patterns sharing a sufficiently
common factual bond—until the time that a hard case points out the exception to
the rule and thus leads to further refinement of jurisprudence and doctrine.488
It is similarly intuitive that an inductive legal system could rely upon
inconsistent first principles in different areas of law. The common law establishes
rules for a case rather than engaging in doctrinal interpretation.489 This rule
establishment depends upon factual similarities of each of the cases relied upon by
the parties to the case at bar.490 In relating the facts at bar to their resemblance of
facts in prior decisions, it is possible both to derive the principle applicable to the
resolution of the dispute at bar and to confirm and adapt its validity in light of
additional factual problems not previously encountered in other cases.491 The
application of inconsistent first principles, as such, is not a problem so long as these
483. Cf. Schauer Domain, supra note 24, at 1932 (“[W]e might imagine a system characterized by
procedural differentiation, in which law is differentiated from other decisionmaking venues not by the
sources it uses but by how it uses them.”).
484. See supra Part III.B.
485. See Wittgenstein, supra note 464, at 420 (“in language, expectation grazes realization”)
(Frédéric G. Sourgens trans.).
486. See Schauer Domain, supra note 24, at 1914-15.
487. Sacco, supra note 321, at 132-33, 256 (noting that the common law was by its nature incomplete
and grew through resolution of disputes); cf. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 11-19 (3d ed. 1999)
(discussing the early development of the enforcement of promises at common law).
488. For an extreme position, see Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common
Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 257 (1987) (arguing that “‘the common law’ is best regarded as
the institutionalized process of adjudication itself, rather than as the body of relatively stable (but
nonetheless constantly changing) dispute-settling standards which emerge from that process.”). A
similar position is espoused by Melvin Eisenberg in the context of finding morally necessary exceptions
to announced and otherwise coherent common law rules. See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 66-68.
489. See Michael S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in PRECEDENT IN
LAW 183-216 (1988) (“[C]ommon law reasoning, like that in science and ethics, is non-hermeneutic in
nature.”); Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 52.
490. See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 54-55, 61; see also S.L. Hurley, Coherence, Hypothetical
Cases, and Precedent, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 221, 223-24 (1990).
491. See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 74; cf. Perry, supra note 488, at 251.
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principles are applied to factually unrelated legal problems.
The inductive normativity of the common law is not only consistent with the
diversity of reasonableness paradigms, but necessitates it. Inductive systems are
typically premised upon the observation of the outside world;492 they are
descriptive systems. In this sense, science engages in inductive reasoning.493
Observation of the world leads to the formulation of scientific paradigms which in
turn are refined by further observation.494 When a sufficient number of significant
experiments contradict the current theory, the prevalent paradigm is abandoned
once a new paradigm has been formulated that reinterprets the accumulated data in
a more effective way.495 In such inductive systems, there is a typically a single
structural paradigm at work at a single point in time.496
Although the common law resembles such descriptive systems, it differs in an
important respect from them. The inductive process is not applied to observe the
outside world, but to govern it.497 This means that at the level of theory, the
inductive process in the common law does not theorize the outside world, it
theorizes itself.498
This important difference creates a structural necessity for diverse
reasonableness paradigms to operate alongside each other. First, the existence of
an inductively formed formal legal paradigm of necessity must be a consciously
theorized result from various data points.499 If the formal legal paradigm were
always “applied” by common law courts by means of interpretation, the system
would cease to be inductive and would be become deductive.500 A formal legal
paradigm cannot operate “in real time” and instead must lag. Logically, this means
that there must be something other than the formal paradigm at work in everyday
adjudication.
But similarly, the law is more than a catalogue of policy preferences and
current community standards.501 The common law is a normative system that seeks
to order rather than describe the world to which it applies. It seeks to impose
certain centrally held values of prior generations on the current generations in order
to provide both continuity and justice.502 Logically, there must also be a formal
492. See Kuhn, supra note 31, at 104 (“The scientist must, for example, be concerned to understand
the world and to extend the precision and scope with which it has been ordered.”).
493. Id. at 73.
494. The initial formulation of a paradigm requires theoretical, even metaphysical, creativity. Id. at
74. Once a paradigm has proved effective at explaining current problems, the object of science is to
refine the paradigm inductively through experimentation. Id. at 96-105.
495. Id. at 166 (while paradigm change is sudden and revolutionary, “scientific revolutions are
inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the scientific
community, that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately.”).
496. Id. at 96-105.
497. This is not to say that observation is not value-dependent. It is. See id. at 106-115. But a
limited legal domain lacks an outside world to “observe” in order to be limited. See Schauer Domain,
supra note 24, at 1914-15.
498. See Schauer Domain, supra note 24, at 1914-15
499. See supra citations in notes 487-489.
500. See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 52 (discussing the inductive nature of the common law); see
generally Moore, supra note 489 at 183-216 (same).
501. See Holmes Common Law, supra note 29, at 3.
502. Id.
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paradigm at work in everyday adjudication.
The different reasonableness paradigms thus fulfill a structural function
without which a system of inductive normativity would cease to function. On the
one hand, the imposition of a single paradigm of formalist reasonableness (as in the
case of constructivism) would transform the common law into a deductive system
of normativity, applying norms exclusively because of the intrinsic value of the law
irrespective of what the law outside requires. On the other hand, the imposition of
a single pragmatic conception of reasonableness would deprive the law of
independent normativity. The law would be an empty shell or conduit for
describing the state of current practices. Such a state would be particularly
dangerous, as it would not enable long term expectations to form: as practice can
change unconstrained by law, there is no guarantee that future practices will not run
counter to current needs. Practice, therefore, needs to be contained by value.
Therefore, the diversity of conceptions of reasonableness is a structural
necessity for an inductive system of normativity to exist. It is not only a historical
accident or necessary stage in the dialectic on the way to some future utopia, it is a
central feature to, and sign of health of, the common law.
V. CONCLUSION
The common law rests upon a diverse set of three reasonableness paradigms: a
pragmatic, a utilitarian, and a formalist one. It is because of the diversity of
reasonableness paradigms that the common law has to resolve such a thing as “hard
cases,” which only arise when the reasonableness paradigms clash. It is through an
internal realignment of these paradigms that doctrine and jurisprudence resolves
these hard cases over time. Because hard cases have to be resolved within the
confines of the three reasonableness paradigms, the legal correctness of any
proposed solution can always be established as a matter of legal reasoning rather
than by debating the moral consequences of its result. It is because of the
possibility to resolve hard cases in a simultaneously principled and pragmatic
manner that the common law has proved uniquely adaptive to new social and
commercial circumstances without losing its inner cohesion.
The conclusion that the law rests upon diverse reasonableness paradigms
confirms the hypothesis, raised a few years ago by Professor Schauer, that the
common law indeed represents a limited domain.503 Picking up where that article
left off, this article has shown that the “Wittgensteinian practice” of the common
law creates a limited domain because of procedural differentiation.504 The process
of legal decisionmaking differs from other decisional models because the law
produces outcomes according to its own distinctive decisional grammar. This
grammar relies upon the three different reasonableness paradigms to generate
norms inductively through constant adjudication of new and novel legal disputes.
Despite the conclusion that law indeed has its own internal and formal logic,
this Article shares much with critical pragmatism. Most of all, this article confirms
that the common law is not a consequentialist enterprise, that no dialectic, no
matter how enticing, could pave the way to some utopian republic. In other words,
503. Schauer Domain, supra note 24, at 1955-56.
504. Id. at 1933 n.71.

130

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1

it considers that most grand theories of law or political theory have something to
sell and that, if experience serves anything, it ain’t worth buying.
Instead, the Article ultimately places its faith in finding the balance of
balances. It does so not by trying to find a midpoint between them. Instead, it
finds the value of the common law in its form of inquiry and its constant
deliberative movement. Accordingly, this deliberative movement is not moving
towards something. It moves to maintain what it has—diversity.

